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Executive	Summary	
Wholesale power markets in the United States have evolved over time.  Some of the more notable 
changes over the last decade include growth in wind and solar, a steep reduction in the price of natural 
gas, limited growth in electrical load, and an increase in the retirement of thermal power plants.  This 
report assesses the impact of these changes on wholesale electricity prices using two approaches.  First, 
a supply curve model is used to quantify impacts to annual average wholesale prices at each centrally 
organized wholesale power market between 2008 and 2017.  Second, hourly wholesale prices at all of 
the more than 60,000 pricing nodes are used to highlight the impacts of wind, solar, and other factors 
on trends in geographic and temporal pricing patterns. 
 
In most markets, growth in wind and solar reduced average wholesale prices by less than $1.3/MWh.  
California is an exception, where growth in solar reduced prices by $2.2/MWh—perhaps foreshadowing 
greater impacts from solar in other regions as solar penetrations grow.  Falling natural gas prices over 
this same period were the dominant driver of average market-wide wholesale prices, reducing average 
annual wholesale prices by $7–$53/MWh.  The impact of wind and solar was secondary compared to 
the impact of natural gas, but among the biggest drivers in a second tier of factors with similar 
magnitudes, Figure ES-1.  The second tier includes expansion and retirement of thermal generation, 
changes in demand, generator efficiency, coal prices, variations in hydropower, and emissions prices. 
 
Figure ES-1. Average wholesale power energy price impact of various factors that changed 
between 2008 and 2017 across all ISO/RTO markets. 
 
RE = renewable energy 
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Beyond the impacts to market-wide average annual wholesale prices, growth in wind and solar had a 
more consequential impact on prices in some locations and in altering how prices change based on the 
hour of the day and season.  Specifically, growth in wind and solar impacted time-of-day and seasonal 
pricing patterns, growth in the frequency of negative prices was correlated geographically with 
deployment of wind and solar (Figure ES-2), and negative prices in high-wind and high-solar regions 
occurred most frequently in hours with high wind and solar output. 
 
Figure ES-2. Frequency of negative real-time power prices in 2017. 
 
LMP = locational marginal price 
 
Despite the recent increase in frequency of negative prices, annual average prices at most locations 
have not been heavily impacted by these negative-price hours because negative prices were mostly 
small in magnitude.  However, some regions have seen significant declines in annual average prices 
owing to negative hourly prices, specifically parts of the Midwest in the Southwest Power Pool, 
California, and northern areas of New York, New Hampshire, and Maine. 
 
The regional clustering of negative prices means that not all generation has been equally impacted.  In 
2017, negative prices decreased the average annual real-time energy price at nodes near wind plants by 
about 6%, at nodes near solar plants by about 3%, and nodes near hydropower plants by about 3%.  
Pricing nodes near coal, gas, and nuclear plants saw a smaller reduction of about 1.5%, though those 
(modest) impacts have slightly increased over time. 
 
Numerous factors beyond wind and solar influence local pricing patterns.  Attempts to assess the 
impacts of wind and solar must carefully consider the full regional context.  
2017
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1. Introduction	
Wholesale power markets in the United States have evolved over time, reflecting changes in State and 
Federal policies, trends in the underlying resource mix and resource costs, and a desire to minimize 
system costs while meeting reliability standards.  Some of the more notable recent changes impacting 
wholesale markets include growth in variable renewable energy (VRE, including wind and solar), a steep 
reduction in the price of natural gas, limited growth in electrical load, an increase in the retirement of 
thermal power plants, and efforts to slow the pace of retirements (DOE 2017). 
 
This report assesses the degree to which growth in VRE has influenced wholesale power market prices 
in the United States—focusing on wholesale power energy prices, and principally on the 2008 to 2017 
period.  Wind and solar power capacity have both grown rapidly, motivated by declining costs (Wiser 
and Bolinger 2018; Bolinger and Seel 2018; Barbose and Darghouth 2018) as well as State and Federal 
policy.1 The unique characteristics of these generation resources, meanwhile, also mean that they may 
have unique impacts on wholesale pricing patterns. 
 
While the focus is VRE, where possible this report also assesses other drivers for the observed trends.  
The focus is also on national and regional system-level pricing trends and impacts in centrally organized 
wholesale markets, rather than impacts on specific power plants.  The effects of State policies or 
particular market designs on price formation in wholesale electricity markets are out of the scope of 
this report, though both are currently topics attracting significant analysis and discussion for some 
regions. 
 
The report first assesses the relative impact of VRE and other factors on annual, market-wide average 
historical wholesale power energy prices (wholesale prices),2 from 20083 through 2017.  The analysis 
includes all centrally organized wholesale markets in the United States, including the California 
Independent System Operator (CAISO), the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT), the Southwest 
Power Pool (SPP), the Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO), the PJM Interconnection 
(PJM), the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO), and the New England Independent System 
Operator (ISO-NE).  Regions outside of those with independent system operators (ISOs)/regional 
transmission organizations (RTOs), i.e., those with bilateral-only markets, are excluded. 
 
A consistent approach across regions results from applying a relatively simple, fundamental supply-
curve model.  The model disentangles the relative influence of wind and solar, changes in natural gas 
prices, plant retirements and additions, electricity load, emissions regulations, and other factors.  The 
same tool is used to assess possible near-future annual average prices in the same regions, including an 
assessment of factors that may either increase or decrease those prices. 
 1	See,	for	example:	http://www.dsireusa.org/.	2	As	a	convention,	market-wide	average	historical	wholesale	power	energy	prices	are	referred	to	as	average	wholesale	prices.		In	contrast,	wholesale	power	energy	prices	at	specific	locations,	which	includes	congestion,	are	referred	to	as	locational	marginal	prices	(LMPs).	3	2008	was	chosen	as	the	starting	point	as	it	saw	the	highest	average	wholesale	prices	across	the	United	States.	
	 	 	
Drivers of Wholesale Power Prices│2 
 
Because the supply-curve modeling focuses only on average price impacts at the system level, the 
report then evaluates historical and recent trends in the temporal and geographic variability of 
wholesale prices, highlighting the impacts of VRE and other factors on pricing trends by location, time 
of day, and season as appropriate.  Understanding how prices vary by location, time of day, and season 
is important, because these are the actual prices faced by generators and thus influence business 
decisions—whether to retire existing plants or build new plants, and how to operate and dispatch 
plants that are built.  Specifically, the report evaluates hourly wholesale power energy pricing 
(locational marginal price, LMP) patterns at more than 60,000 pricing nodes across the United States, 
again focusing on ISO/RTO regions.  The report explores geographic trends in annual average prices and 
trends in the overall distribution of prices, with special emphasis on the prevalence and causes of 
negative wholesale prices and some of the possible impacts of those prices.  The report also evaluates a 
number of constrained pricing areas (“hot spots”) to highlight the myriad drivers for pricing variations 
that occur based on location.  The focus is on real-time (RT) prices (energy and congestion), but some 
treatment of day-ahead (DA) prices is included. 
 
In both cases, the report builds on past literature (summarized in the next section), and refines and 
extends previous work by the same authors (Wiser et al. 2017)—increasing the geographic scope and 
resolution of the previous analysis; refining the methods, data, and factors considered; assessing 
impacts on DA (as well as RT) prices, estimating possible near-future impacts, and more. 
 
This analysis is relevant to and may therefore inform a wide variety of contemporary discussions in the 
electric sector, at the State, regional, and Federal levels and among policymakers, regulators, system 
operators, utility planners, and supply- and demand-side resource investors: 
 
• Geographic variations in prices can help illustrate the value of transmission expansion in order to 
reduce congestion, though any value so assessed ought to be balanced against the cost of new 
transmission infrastructure. 
• Geographic price variability can also help inform power plant planning and siting decisions, because 
those prices signal locations where new generator additions might be more or less valuable. 
• Temporal variations in wholesale prices, meanwhile, illustrate and—in part—dictate the value of 
flexible resources to the extent that flexible supply-side, demand-side, and storage resources can 
exploit and thereby help alleviate price variations. 
• To the degree that price variations in general and negative wholesale prices in particular are 
affected by policy or institutional decisions, understanding the scope and prevalence of such 
impacts might inform policy reform decisions as well as ISO/RTO market design. 
• Improved understanding of the drivers for wholesale price changes (and therefore revenue 
adequacy) may inform policy and market discussions related to the retirement of thermal plants to 
the extent that it may be easier to justify supporting at-risk generation if the drivers are policy 
related rather than simply decreased competitiveness relative to other resource options. 
• Wholesale pricing trends and drivers may signal the value of or need for changes to wholesale 
power market design or participation to the extent that those pricing signals reflect an inability to 
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access the extant flexibility in the system. 
• Finally, altered pricing patterns impact not only thermal plants, but also the market value of VRE, 
thereby affecting the economic competitiveness of VRE absent policy support. 
 
A number of general points on the scope and limitations of the analysis deserve note. 
 
• The focus is exclusively on the energy (and congestion) components of wholesale prices (LMPs) in 
regions with ISOs/RTOs.  LMPs do not embed all the costs of operating the bulk power system, such 
as ancillary services, the cost of capacity (outside of the “energy-only” market design in ERCOT), or 
the full cost of transmission.  The aggregate revenue of a generator participating in a wholesale 
market depends on the LMPs, ancillary service prices, capacity prices, and the dispatch of that 
generator.  The focus on only LMPs therefore does not cover the full impact of wholesale prices on 
generator revenue.4  
• While the results are relevant to the value and profitability of various supply-side, demand-side, 
transmission, and storage assets, those implications are not comprehensively assessed. 
• Because the analysis does not address the cost of VRE or the cost of transmission, it also does not 
assess the full retail costs of electricity supply; instead, the emphasis is on the historical impacts of 
VRE on wholesale market prices. 
• Many contracts between generators and loads exist outside of centrally organized wholesale spot 
markets.  In this case, the LMP reflects the grid value of power and establishes the opportunity cost 
of not selling into or buying from the wholesale market, but it does not necessarily have a direct 
impact on the contracting parties.  Similarly, some resources might participate in DA markets but 
then “self-schedule” in RT markets.  In this case, the RT LMP establishes the opportunity cost for 
not participating in the RT market, but it does not have a direct impact on DA revenues.  Ideally, 
market prices are not affected by the particulars of the contracting and hedging arrangements, 
because the system operator need not consider these arrangements in conducting the dispatch 
(Hogan 2016). 
• The analysis seeks to decompose the core factors influencing wholesale prices, but wholesale 
markets are regionally varied and complex, so the simplified analysis is—by necessity—limited and 
incomplete. 
• The focus is on areas of the country with centrally organized wholesale electricity markets 
(principally located within regions covered by ISOs/RTOs).  Many of the issues addressed are also 
relevant—at least broadly—to regions with vertically integrated electric utilities and bilateral-only 
markets that operate outside of ISO/RTO regions.5  
 4	In	restructured	markets,	most	generators	receive	the	majority	of	their	revenues	through	wholesale	energy	markets;	see	the	various	ISO/RTO	market	monitoring	reports	(e.g.,	Potomac	Economics	2018a,	2018d,	2018b,	2018c;	Monitoring	Analytics	2018;	SPP	2018a;	CAISO	2018).		Reserve	markets	deliver	additional	revenue	to	some	generators,	but	generally	in	small	quantities.		In	some	regions,	like	the	three	eastern	ISOs/RTOs	with	mandatory	capacity	markets	(or	requirements	elsewhere	that	lead	to	bilateral	capacity	contracts)	provide	additional	revenue	to	encourage	resource	adequacy,	whereas	in	others	(e.g.,	ERCOT)	it	is	presumed	that	energy-market	prices	embed	compensation	for	capacity	during	scarcity	events.	5	References	to	wholesale	electricity	prices	in	this	report	are	most	commonly	associated	with	markets	featuring	an	ISO/RTO,	though	less-liquid	wholesale	markets	exist	outside	of	ISO/RTO	regions	and,	if	so,	are	included	in	this	analysis.	
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• By focusing on historical observed effects, the analysis may overstate the effects of VRE relative to 
what might occur in a long-run equilibrium.  As VRE is added to an energy system, the long-run 
resource mix will gravitate towards a portfolio that accounts for the growing shares of VRE, which 
will tend to moderate the effects of VRE relative to what is observed in the near term prior to any 
adjustment in other resources.  On the other hand, this is primarily (though not exclusively) an 
historical analysis of the period from 2008 to 2017, and the future impacts of VRE may become 
more pronounced should growth in VRE continue.  
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2. Background	
 The	recent	evolution	of	wholesale	power	markets	
United States wholesale power pricing and bulk power system composition and operation have 
changed in recent years.6 Average annual wholesale prices have declined substantially since 2008, while 
also experiencing sizable temporal and geographic variability.  Oft-noted causes for these altered 
pricing patterns include the steep reduction in natural gas prices, the rise of VRE, and the moderation of 
load growth. 
 
Regardless of the cause, a result of the reduced prices (among other factors) has been growth in 
thermal-plant retirements and a general decline in the capacity factors (and increased cycling) of coal 
power plants.7 These changes have led to calls from some quarters to slow the pace of retirements 
through policy intervention and/or revisions to wholesale market design.8 Separately, wholesale power 
markets have also evolved to better respond to the increased variability of VRE, in part by encouraging 
supply-side and demand-side flexibility, with discussions ongoing about further necessary adjustments.9 
Utility planners and regulators as well as private-market actors have similarly responded to the growth 
in VRE by planning for and investing in measures to enhance flexibility and respond to periods of over-
generation.  The marginal market value of VRE in wholesale markets, meanwhile, has declined over 
time, in part due to wind and solar suppressing prices during periods of high VRE output (Wiser and 
Bolinger 2018; Bolinger and Seel 2018). 
 
 Literature	review	of	wholesale	power	price	drivers	
Wholesale power prices are affected by the presence of VRE and the incentives motivating VRE 
deployment, but also by a wide array of other factors, including the source mix, fuel prices, 
environmental regulations, other variable operating costs, electric system flexibility, electricity load 
patterns, transmission availability, market design, degree of integration with neighboring markets, and 
policy interventions.  Given the myriad influencing factors, an open question is how and to what extent 
VRE deployment and the incentives motivating that deployment contribute to wholesale price patterns. 
  
A large literature clarifies the unique characteristics of wind and solar resources, and investigates how 
those characteristics have affected or may in the future impact wholesale power prices (Wiser et al. 
2017).  Key characteristics of VRE and the associated physical and wholesale-pricing implications are 
 6	These	changes	are	summarized	by	DOE	(2017,	2018);	Wiser	et	al.		(2017),	Mills,	Wiser,	and	Seel	(2017);	and	Hibbard,	Tierney,	and	Franklin	(2017).	7	See	DOE	(2017);	Mills,	Wiser,	and	Seel	(2017);	Hibbard,	Tierney,	and	Franklin	(2017);	Linn	and	McCormack	(2017);	and	EIA	2018a.	8	Examples	include	Gifford	and	Larson	(2017,	2016);	Haratyk	(2017);	Balash	et	al.	(2018);	Makovich	and	Richards	(2017);	and	Shawhan	and	Picciano(	2019).	9	Summaries	of	changes	and	ongoing	discussions	include	Ela	et	al.	(2017,	2016);	Milligan	et	al.	(2016);	IEA	(2016);	Chang	et	al.	(2017);	Hogan	and	Pope	(2017);	Hogan	(2010);	Newberry	et	al.	(2017);	Orvis	and	Aggarwal	(2017);	Spees	et	al.	(2018);	Herrero,	Rodilla,	and	Batlle	(2018);	Llobet	and	Padilla	(2018);	and	Goggin	et	al.	(2018).	
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summarized in Figure 1. 
 
Figure	1.	VRE	characteristics	and	expected	impacts	on	the	bulk	power	system.	
 
AS = ancillary services 
 
Much of the literature supporting the wholesale price impacts summarized in Figure 1 is based on 
modeled scenarios with higher levels of VRE than are currently experienced.10,11 Studies often show 
 10	For	a	summary	of	the	literature	focused	on	the	United	States,	see	Wiser	et	al.	(2017),	or	see	individual	studies	(e.g.,	GE	Energy	2005,	2010a,	2014;	Fagan	et	al.	2012,	2013;	NESCOE	2017;	Brancucci	Martinez-Anido,	Brinkman,	and	Hodge	2016;	LCG	2016;	ISO-NE	2016;	Tabors	et	al.	2015;	Tabors,	Rudkevich,	and	Hornby	2014;	NY-ISO	2010;	ABB	2014;	NREL	2012;	Deetjen	et	al.	2016;	ISO-NE	2017a;	Green	and	Léautier	2015;	Hummon	et	al.	2013;	Mills	and	Wiser	2012;	EnerNex	2011;	Levin	and	Botterud	2015;	Seel,	Mills,	and	Wiser	2018).	11	Literature	from	Europe	and	Australia	also	includes	empirical	and	modeled	assessments	(Sensfuß,	Ragwitz,	and	Genoese	2008;	Welisch,	Ortner,	and	Resch	2016;	Perez-Arriaga	and	Batlle	2012;	Kyritsis,	Andersson,	and	Serletis	2017;	Brouwer	et	al.	2016;	Würzburg,	Labandeira,	and	Linares	2013;	Cludius	et	al.	2014;	Cutler	et	al.	2011;	MacCormack	et	al.	2010;	Ederer	2015;	Haas	et	al.	2013;	Clò,	Cataldi,	and	Zoppoli	2015;	Sáenz	de	Miera,	del	Río	González,	and	Vizcaíno	2008;	Green	and	Léautier	2015;	Benhmad	and	Percebois	2018;	Annan-Phan	and	Roques	2018).		
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greater impacts with higher levels of VRE.  Impacts from modeled high VRE scenarios may therefore 
foreshadow impacts with continued VRE growth from current levels. 
 
A consistent theme in the literature is that the degree and nature of any VRE-induced pricing impact are 
affected by the underlying physical and institutional flexibility of the electricity system (e.g., Cochran et 
al. 2014; Denholm et al. 2016; IEA 2011).  Specifically, some of the physical and wholesale price impacts 
listed in Figure 1 will be less pronounced when the rest of the electricity system is flexible and thus 
better able to respond to shifts in demand and VRE availability (e.g., Chang et al. 2017).  In part as a 
result, under “equilibrium” conditions (after retirement and new investment decisions are made 
accounting for VRE), the scale of any pricing impacts is expected to moderate, at least to some degree 
(Hirth 2013; Sáenz de Miera, del Río González, and Vizcaíno 2008). 
 
2.2.1 Literature	on	impacts	of	VRE	on	annual	average	wholesale	power	prices	
An increasing number of studies address the already-observed empirical impacts of growing VRE 
penetrations on wholesale power prices.12 Some studies have used historical observations to estimate 
the impact of VRE on average wholesale power energy prices in different regions of the United States 
(Table 1).  In restructured markets, wholesale energy prices (i.e., LMPs) are generally set by the 
generation offer cost of the marginal unit in a given period at a given location.  Exceptions to this can 
occur, particularly in the presence of transmission congestion or when supply is insufficient to meet 
demand and prices are set based on demand bids or administratively set prices.  The addition of VRE 
with low marginal costs shifts the supply curve out to the right, leading to lower market-clearing prices, 
all else being constant; the same would be true for any low-marginal-cost source.  Incentives for VRE to 
bid into markets at negative prices may accentuate this effect, but only when those bids are on the 
margin.13 This price reduction is often referred to as the “merit-order effect.” The wholesale price 
reduction is sometimes touted as a benefit to consumers that purchase power in wholesale markets, 
but it represents an economic transfer from generators to consumers rather than a net social benefit 
(Felder 2011). 
  
 12	Studies	addressing	already-observed	impacts	include	wind	and	solar	(e.g.,	Maggio	2012;	Woo	et	al.	2011,	2013,	2014;	Woo,	Horowitz,	et	al.	2016;	Woo,	Moore,	et	al.	2016;	Gil	and	Lin	2013;	Wiser	et	al.	2016;	Jenkins	2017;	Hogan	and	Pope	2017;	Makovich	and	Richards	2017;	DOE	2017;	Bajwa	and	Cavicchi	2017;	DOE	2018;	R.	H.	Wiser	et	al.	2017;	Haratyk	2017;	Craig	et	al.	2018;	Bushnell	and	Novan	2018;	Quint	and	Dahlke	2019;	Tsai	and	Eryilmaz	2018).	
13 The PJM market monitor reports that 3%–7% of the marginal units in the RT market in PJM were wind between 2013 and 
2017 (Monitoring Analytics 2018).  MISO, meanwhile, has areas where local prices are frequently set by wind, even though wind 
never set the system-wide marginal price in 2017 (Potomac Economics 2018d). 	
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Table	1.	Average	wholesale	power	energy	price	reduction	associated	with	VRE	growth.	
Study Applicable Region Period 
Average VRE Penetration 
(% of demand) 
Decrease in Average Wholesale 
Power Energy Price from 
Average VRE 
Woo et al. (2011) ERCOT 2007-2010 Wind: 5.1% Wind: $2.7/MWh (ERCOT North) Wind: $6.8/MWh (ERCOT West) 
Woo et al. (2013) Pacific NW  (Mid-C) 2006-2012 N/A  Wind: $3.9/MWh 
Woo et al. (2014) CAISO (SP15) 2010-2012 
Wind: 3.4% 
Solar: 0.6% 
Wind: $8.9/MWh  
Solar: $1.2/MWh  
Woo et al. (2016) CAISO  (SP15) 2012-2015 
Wind: 4.3% 
Solar: 2.6% 
Wind: $7.7/MWh  
Solar: $2.1/MWh 
Gil and Lin (2013) PJM 2010 Wind: 1.3% Wind: $5.3/MWh 
Wiser et al. 
(2016)a 
Various 
regions  2013 
RPS energy: 0%-16% 
depending on the region 
RPS energy: $0 to $4.6/MWh 
depending on the region 
Craig et al. (2018) CAISO 2013-2015 Distributed solar: ~5% Distributed solar: < $1/MWh  
Tsai and Eryilmaz 
(2018) ERCOT 2014-2016 Wind: 11% Wind: $8 to $12/MWh 
Quint and Dahlke 
(2019) MISO 2014-2016 Wind: 6% Wind: $6.7/MWh 
Jenkins (2017)b PJM  2008-2016 N/A Wind: $1 to $2.5/MWh 
Wiser et al. 
(2017)b CAISO 2008-2016 
Solar: á 9.5% 2008-2016 
Wind: á 3.3% 2008-2016 
Solar: $1.9/MWh 
Wind: $0.4/MWh 
Wiser et al. 
(2017)b ERCOT 2008-2016 
Wind: á 10.8% 2008-2016 
Solar: á 0.3% 2008-2016 
Wind: $0.7/MWh 
Solar: $0/MWh 
Haratyk (2017)b Midwest 2008-2015 Wind: á 9% 2008-2015 Wind: $4.6/MWh 
Haratyk (2017)b Mid-Atlantic 2008-2015 N/A  Wind: $0/MWh 
Bushnell and 
Novan (2018)b CAISO 2012-2016 
Utility-scale solar: 
á 8.3% 2012-2016 Solar: $5.2/MWh 
Notes: a – Price effect is estimated impact of renewables portfolio standards (RPS) energy relative to price without RPS energy 
in 2013 before making adjustments due to the decay effect discussed by the authors.  b – Decrease in average wholesale price 
is based on change in wind or solar energy from beginning to end of the period, rather than the decrease from average wind or 
solar reported in other rows. 
 
Table 1 reports the historical effect of VRE on average annual wholesale power energy prices, based on 
the available literature.  In some cases, the table reports results as a decrease in the average wholesale 
power energy price with the average amount of VRE over the study period, relative to the average price 
without the VRE; where available, the table includes the VRE penetration as the average VRE over the 
period relative to the average demand.  In other cases, the table reports the impact of growth in VRE 
over a specified period on annual average wholesale prices.  The estimated reduction in average 
wholesale prices from wind and solar ranges from $0–$12/MWh, depending on the region, the period 
of the analysis, the VRE technology and its level of penetration, and the study.  A study focused on 
ERCOT finds higher merit-order effects in the wind-rich West Texas region, where transmission 
constraints led to reduced and negative prices before Competitive Renewable Energy Zone (CREZ) 
transmission assets were completed in 2013 (EIA 2014).  Another study estimates the relative impact of 
different drivers for wholesale price reductions from 2008 through 2016, finding that the decline in 
natural gas prices was the dominant factor, resulting in wholesale price reductions of roughly 
$20/MWh; growth of wind was found to have a much smaller effect of about $1–$2.5/MWh (Jenkins 
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2017).  This is consistent with the results shown in Wiser et al. (2017), which found that natural gas 
price reductions have been the dominant driver for low wholesale prices in ERCOT and CAISO over the 
last decade, with VRE growth playing a much smaller role.  It is also consistent with the results in 
Haratyk (2017), which demonstrate that the declining price of natural gas was a larger influence on 
wholesale prices between 2008 and 2015 in both the Midwest and Mid-Atlantic than was growth 
in VRE. 
 
Additional studies, sometimes using more stylized and/or partial assessments, are not included in Table 
1.  Makovich and Richards (2017), for example, find that wind in ERCOT reduced market-clearing prices 
by one third during the 2014 peak-demand period, but that “wind output wholesale price suppression 
around the average load segment is relatively modest because the supply curve is relatively flat.” A 
quantitative assessment of the price-suppression impacts outside of the peak-demand period is not 
provided, and no annual average estimate is presented.  Makovich and Richards (2017) also explore the 
impacts of wind in PJM in 2015, finding that wind output suppressed prices by 24% during the 15% of 
maximum net-load hours, 4% during the 15% of hours around average net load, and 9% during the 
minimum net-load hours.  Hibbard, Tierney, and Franklin (2017) and Hogan and Pope (2017) present 
somewhat similar analyses, for PJM and ERCOT, respectively, but neither offers a clear assessment of 
historical impacts on annual average wholesale prices. 
 
This sample of U.S.-focused studies is a subset of a much broader literature of similar analyses of the 
price effect of wind and solar in Europe, with many of the studies summarized by Welisch, Ortner, and 
Resch (2016) and Würzburg, Labandeira, and Linares (2013).  Related work has sought to explore the 
relative influence of VRE and other factors on past wholesale prices in Europe (Kallabis, Pape, and 
Weber 2016; Hirth 2018; Bublitz, Keles, and Fichtner 2017).  Overall, the merit-order effect estimates 
reported in Table 1 are within the range of results for wind and solar in European countries. 
 
2.2.2 Literature	on	impacts	of	VRE	on	geographic	and	temporal	variations	in	wholesale	
power	prices	
Wholesale electricity price volatility may also be expected to increase in systems with high VRE 
penetrations.  Woo et al. (2011), for example, predict that a 10% increase in wind will increase the 
variance of wholesale prices by 1% in ERCOT North and 5% in the wind-rich ERCOT West.  Levin and 
Botterud (2015) and Mills and Wiser (2012) similarly show that energy market price volatility generally 
increases with increasing VRE penetration.  Other work, however, has found that growth in wind has 
had a particularly large price-suppression effect during peak periods, at least in ERCOT and PJM 
(Makovich and Richards 2017).  Wiser et al. (2017), meanwhile, examine the volatility of RT prices at a 
small number of major pricing hubs across the United States, but they do not find any compelling 
trends over time related to increasing VRE penetrations.  The market monitor for ERCOT, however, has 
suggested that higher price volatility in the spring and fall months of 2015 and 2016 was associated 
with higher wind volatility and load and wind forecast errors (Potomac Economics 2017a). 
 
One clear signal for price volatility comes in the form of the frequency of negative wholesale energy 
prices.  Negative prices typically arise from surplus supply along with technical or economic constraints 
	 	 	
Drivers of Wholesale Power Prices│10 
that prevent reductions in generation output.  Transmission limitations tend to be an accelerant of 
negative pricing, driving prices lower in congested markets as the surplus supply is unable to find other 
markets in which to sell.14 Because negative pricing is a symptom of excess supply, the prevalence of 
negative pricing is greater during periods with lower system-wide load.  Excess supply conditions can be 
exacerbated when potential sources of flexibility do not participate in markets.  For example, load 
serving entities can choose to “self-supply” by using their own generation to meet their electrical 
demand, irrespective of market prices.  Similarly, rigid contracts that do not allow for economic 
curtailment can exacerbate conditions.  ISO-NE highlights several periods in which unpriced generation 
(resulting from fixed imports, self-scheduled generation, and generation up to economic minimum 
levels) was almost sufficient to meet periods of low demand, leading to very little generation being 
economically dispatched to meet demand and—as a result—bids with negative prices clearing the 
market (ISO-NE 2018).  Up to a point, policy incentives (see Section 2.3) for renewable resources 
provide an incentive for renewable generators to continue to produce energy even when the energy 
price is negative.  Even market demand for “green energy” yields positive prices for renewable energy 
credits (RECs), creating incentives for negative-price bids by VRE.  
 
Of course, VRE resources are not the only resources that bid negative prices in wholesale markets.  The 
lack of flexibility from existing U.S. nuclear power plants, for example, means that these plants will 
often self-schedule or bid negative prices to avoid costly shutdowns and startups.  Some nuclear 
generation in PJM, for example, both self-schedules a certain amount of must-run generation and then 
bids a small fraction of the generation as dispatchable at negative prices (Monitoring Analytics 2018).  
Fossil units (coal or natural gas) may also contribute to negative prices, in part due to costs associated 
with startup and shutdown.  In ERCOT, for example, the energy up to minimum generation levels is 
considered by the dispatch software to have a price of negative $250/MWh (Potomac Economics 
2018a).  Even hydropower plants sometimes generate during negative-priced hours, in some cases due 
to run-of-river operations and in others as a result of environmental and other flow constraints.  Other 
units may have contractual requirements that create the same incentives for negative bidding, or they 
may be required to operate for reliability purposes regardless of market pricing and are therefore 
compensated through other contractual means.  
 
Wiser et al. (2017) explore pricing at a limited number of major pricing hubs across the United States, 
finding that negative prices in most of these hubs continue to be rare, and almost nonexistent in DA 
prices.  However, there is evidence of increased frequency of negative RT prices with increasing VRE.  
Further analysis of the time and geographic profiles of negative pricing events can help identify the 
many underlying causes.  It can also inform the geographic scope of negative pricing events given that 
transmission limits between generation locations and load centers can lead to congestion and a higher 
prevalence of negative pricing in constrained zones and nodes.  Wiser et al. (2017), for example, also 
focus on two “hot spots” for negative wholesale prices: West Texas and Northern Illinois.  They show 
that high levels of VRE, nuclear, and hydropower—especially in concert with low load and transmission 
 14	Section	4	further	describes	an	example	in	ISO-NE	where	negative	prices	could	occur	at	particular	nodes	owing	to	transmission	congestion	even	prior	to	negative	bids	being	allowed	by	generators.		Once	negative	bids	were	allowed,	negative	prices	became	more	frequent	and	widespread.	
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limits—can boost the frequency of negative pricing; new transmission investment, meanwhile, can 
lower the prevalence of negative prices.  Hogan and Pope (2017) find that the profile of negative pricing 
in ERCOT correlates with wind production, and CAISO (2017b) shows that negative prices occurred 
during daytime hours in 2016—times of high solar generation—whereas most were during nighttime 
hours in 2012.  Bajwa and Cavicchi (2017) review numerous hubs in many of the U.S. ISOs/RTOs, 
tracking negative pricing trends over time and diurnally, finding that the trends in negative-price hours 
suggest a VRE impact.  DOE (2018) similarly reports the frequency of negative prices, as well as overall 
price distributions for the energy and congestion components of LMPs, across the United States.  The 
effect of hydropower on negative prices in California and the Northwest is covered in Davis (2017). 
 
Finally, the temporal patterns of wholesale energy prices may also change as a result of growth in VRE.  
This is evident in the many modeling studies cited earlier.  It is also already observed in California, 
where strong solar output generally reduces prices during sunny midday periods (especially when 
runoff driving hydropower is also significant and load is low), but then causes prices to increase as the 
sun sets and other generation resources respond to the system’s net-load ramp (Bushnell and Novan 
2018). 
 
 Policy	incentives	and	their	influence	on	wholesale	power	prices	
Some have noted that policy incentives for VRE can exacerbate pricing impacts.  In particular, wind 
energy has historically received a 10-year Federal production tax credit (PTC).  Additionally, both solar 
and wind benefit from renewables portfolio standards (RPS) in many states.  RPS policies require load-
serving entities to meet a specified share of their sales with energy produced by RPS-eligible 
generators.  Depending on the state, load-serving entities achieve these targets through the purchase 
of RECs that put a value on energy generated by RPS-eligible resources above the wholesale price of 
power.  Federal and State policies create incentives to deploy low-marginal-cost wind and solar 
resources, sometimes in the absence of any obvious physical energy-system need for additional 
generation or capacity.  As described in Section 2.2, this deployment of additional generation can lead 
to lower wholesale power prices.  Moreover, the PTC and State RPS programs create incentives for VRE 
plant owners and purchasers to bid that generation into wholesale markets at negative prices.  The 
reason is simple: curtailment of generation will result in not only lost energy-based revenue, but also 
potentially lost incentive value (Hogan and Pope 2017; Levin and Botterud 2015).  The investment tax 
credit (ITC), used for solar energy, does not create a similar incentive for bidding at negative prices. 
 
 Influence	of	wholesale	price	patterns	on	economic	competitiveness	of	
various	investments	
The altered wholesale price patterns that result from increased VRE will impact the relative profitability 
of different electric-sector assets.  As detailed in Wiser et al. (2017) and summarized in Figure 1, the 
pricing impacts tend to favor flexible supply- and demand-side technologies, especially those with lower 
capital costs, and tend to disadvantage technologies with high capital costs and a lack of flexibility 
attributes.  Temporal pricing volatility can also favor storage (Denholm, Eichman, and Margolis 2017; 
Denholm and Margolis 2016), whereas geographic patterns in prices can signal the value of new 
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transmission infrastructure (Du and Rubin 2018; FERC 2017).  
 
While most of the literature is based on modeled scenarios with higher levels of VRE penetration than 
are currently experienced,15,16 some VRE influences are already apparent and/or are being discussed 
internationally and in some regions of the United States.17  
 
VRE investments may be particularly impacted by the resulting wholesale price patterns, because VRE 
depresses prices in the very hours with high VRE generation.  While VRE investors may be shielded from 
this “value decline” in the event that long-term fixed-price contracts exist, the decline in system value 
of VRE will, in that instance, affect the purchaser of VRE generation.  Some of the literature has focused 
on historical trends in wind and solar value in the United States, Europe, and Australia based on 
observed wholesale price patterns and VRE output.18 Other literature relies on modeled (and typically 
higher-VRE-penetration) scenarios.19 A subset of the literature, meanwhile, has also explored how to 
boost (or slow the decline of) the system value of VRE with increasing penetration, through changes in 
renewable technologies and deployment as well as changes in broader system-level electric conditions 
such as new transmission, increased generation and load flexibility, and storage.20  
  
 15	Studies	based	on	models	include	(e.g.,	Traber	and	Kemfert	2011;	Lamont	2008;	Bushnell	2010;	DOE	2012,	2015;	NREL	2012;	Mills	and	Wiser	2012,	2015,	2014;	Steggals,	Gross,	and	Heptonstall	2011;	Di	Cosmo	and	Malaguzzi	Valeri	2014;	De	Jonghe	et	al.	2011;	Chao	2011;	Brouwer	et	al.	2016;	Clò	and	D’Adamo	2015;	Levin	and	Botterud	2015;	Bloom	et	al.	2016;	GE	Energy	2010b;	Agora	2015;	Green	and	Léautier	2015;	Bistline	2017).	16	Most	of	these	studies	investigate	the	price	effects	of	combined	wind	and	solar	penetrations	up	to	30%	of	a	system's	annual	energy	requirements,	though	some	publications	analyze	shares	up	to	50%	(Lamont	2008;	NREL	2012;	Brouwer	et	al.	2016;	Bistline	2017)	or	even	75%	(Agora	2015).	17	Studies	based	on	observed	impacts	include	(e.g.,	Makovich	and	Richards	2017;	Potomac	Economics	2017a,	2017b;	SPP	2017;	CAISO	2017;	FERC	2017;	Bushnell	and	Novan	2018).	18	Literature	on	the	observed	value	includes	(Hirth	2016;	Clò,	Cataldi,	and	Zoppoli	2015;	Cutler	et	al.	2011;	Welisch,	Ortner,	and	Resch	2016;	Gilmore	et	al.	2014;	Bolinger	and	Seel	2018;	Wiser	and	Bolinger	2018;	Bushnell	and	Novan	2018).	19	Literature	on	the	modeled	value	includes	(e.g.,	Mills	and	Wiser	2012,	2013,	2014;	Hirth	2013;	Hirth,	Ueckerdt,	and	Edenhofer	2015;	Lamont	2008;	Bushnell	2010;	Green	and	Léautier	2015;	Sivaram	and	Kann	2016;	Olson	and	Jones	2012;	Levin	and	Botterud	2015;	Bistline	2017;	Birk	and	Tabors	2017;	Agora	2015;	MIT	2015;	Reichenberg	et	al.	2018).	
20	Studies	include	(e.g.,	Mills	and	Wiser	2015;	Hirth	2016;	Denholm	et	al.	2016;	Deetjen	et	al.	2016;	Winkler	et	al.	2016;	Hartner	et	al.	2015;	Ederer	2015;	Obersteiner	2012;	Tveten,	Kirkerud,	and	Bolkesjø	2016;	Hirth	and	Müller	2016;	Denholm	and	Margolis	2016;	Denholm	et	al.	2015;	Denholm,	Clark,	and	O’Connell	2016;	Birk	and	Tabors	2017;	May	2017;	Obersteiner	and	Saguan	2011;	Riva,	Hethey,	and	Vitina	2017;	Denholm,	Eichman,	and	Margolis	2017;	Gilmore	et	al.	2014;	Forsberg	et	al.	2017;	Hale,	Stoll,	and	Novacheck	2018;	Johansson	et	al.	2017).		
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3. Impacts	of	VRE	on	Annual	Average	Wholesale	Power	Prices	
 Data	and	methods	
To estimate the impact of VRE on market-wide, annual average wholesale power energy prices, this 
report applies a simple fundamental model in each of the seven centrally organized U.S. wholesale 
power markets.  The approach is transparent, consistent across all regions, and disentangles the 
relative influence of wind and solar, changes in natural gas prices, plant retirements and additions, 
electricity load, emissions regulations, and other factors. 
 
In this model, for each ISO/RTO, annual average wholesale prices are based on intersecting a supply 
curve with net demand (demand net of wind and solar) in each hour and then averaging of the prices 
across all hours of the year (Figure 2).  Electricity demand, wind, and solar vary by hour based on 
historical weather patterns (based on hourly data largely reported by the system operators).  
Hydropower and imports similarly vary by hour, though the hourly patterns are based on historically 
observed relationships between hydropower, monthly precipitation and net demand, or imports and 
net demand, respectively.  The supply curve is developed by sorting individual generators in ascending 
order of variable generation costs.  Fuel costs, the main contributor to variable costs, change by day for 
natural gas-fired units, by month for coal-fired units, and by year for other generators.  Natural gas 
costs are based on trading prices at market hubs, while all other fuel costs are based on regional 
average production costs reported by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA).  Variable costs 
also include annual average costs of emissions permits—for carbon dioxide (CO2), sulfur dioxide (SO2), 
and nitrogen oxides (NOx)—where applicable.  The heat rate of individual generators varies by month 
and historical year.  Generator availability and capacity vary by season.  In some instances, prices are 
not set by the marginal generator in the supply curve and are instead based on assumed penalty prices.  
Specifically, if the intersection of the supply curve and demand falls below the minimum generation 
level, based on nuclear and combined-heat-and-power capacity, prices are assumed to equal a negative 
bid price of -$3 to -$17/MWh, depending on the region.  The negative bid prices are based on the actual 
observed average negative price in 2017 for each region.  Alternatively, if the demand plus an assumed 
operating reserve margin of 5% exceeds estimated supply, prices are assumed to increase to a penalty 
price of $1,000/MWh.21 This simple supply-curve model does not include resources such as storage and 
demand response.  Storage is particularly challenging to capture in a simple supply-curve model owing 
to the importance of considering how decisions to charge or discharge storage in one hour will impact 
the ability to discharge in subsequent hours.  Additional details on the data and assumptions associated 
with these supply-curve models are included in Appendix A. 
 
 
 
 21	Simple	assumptions	are	used	here	for	operating	reserves,	negative	prices,	and	penalty	prices	rather	than	developing	very	detailed	assumptions	for	each	region	based	on	actual	market	rules.		This	decision	is	based	on	the	limitations	of	the	simple	supply-curve	model	in	capturing	myriad	factors	that	drive	extreme	prices	and	not	wanting	to	convey	a	false	sense	of	precision,	particularly	with	respect	to	capturing	extreme	prices	fully.	
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Figure	2.	Illustration	of	the	supply-curve	method	for	estimating	hourly	prices	based	on	the	
intersection	of	supply	and	net	demand.	
 
Figure	3.	Comparison	of	modeled	and	actual	RT	(top)	and	DA	(bottom)	average	annual	wholesale	
power	energy	prices	(left)	and	the	standard	deviation	of	wholesale	prices	(right)	for	different	
historical	years	and	market	regions.	
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RT = real-time; DA = day-ahead; LMP = locational marginal price 
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The modeled wholesale prices vary depending on the shape of the supply curve and the distribution of 
the net demand.  Natural gas prices in particular can impact the shape and level of the supply curve.  
Figure 2, for example, shows that—with high natural gas prices in 2008—the supply curve had a distinct 
step between the variable costs of coal-fired plants (up to about 27 GW of supply) and the variable 
costs of natural gas-fired plants.  With 2008 natural gas prices, relatively small changes in demand, 
variable generation, or thermal-plant retirements or additions could shift the supply curve or net 
demand distribution in ways that significantly impacted wholesale prices.  By 2017, however, the lower 
natural gas prices eliminated the large step change in the supply curve between coal-fired and natural 
gas-fired plants.  With this flatter supply curve, relatively small changes in demand, variable generation, 
and thermal capacity had much more muted impacts on wholesale prices. 
 
By fixing all parameters to their historical levels in 2008, 2012, and 2017, the simple model can 
reasonably replicate average annual wholesale energy prices at major trading hubs in each centrally 
organized power market (Figure 3).22,23 In contrast, comparing the standard deviations of modeled 
hourly prices to those of the actual hub prices shows that the model is not as effective in representing 
hour-to-hour variability, though the variability of the modeled prices is closer to the variability of DA 
prices than it is to the variability of RT prices.  In particular, the distribution of prices from the simple 
supply-curve model tends to be much narrower than the distribution of actual RT prices (i.e., the model 
shows fewer very high-price or low-price events than the number of events observed in actual RT 
prices; see Appendix A).  This result is expected, because the model does not account for many of the 
flexibility attributes and constraints embedded in real markets.  It is also why this analysis uses the 
model solely to assess the impact of various drivers of market-wide average annual wholesale prices, 
and not to explore geographic and temporal variability in those prices. 
 
More specifically, this analysis uses the simple supply-curve model to estimate the impacts of changing 
one factor at a time between historical years across all ISOs/RTOs.  For example, the impact of wind or 
solar on average wholesale prices in 2017 is estimated by changing the wind or solar to its 2008 level 
while keeping all other factors constant at their 2017 levels.  By individually changing each factor from 
its 2017 level to its 2008 level, this analysis can disentangle the relative contribution of different factors 
to the observed decline in average annual wholesale prices between 2008 and 2017.  The same 
approach is applied over the 2012–2017 period as well, also to explore the relative contribution of 
different drivers. 
 22	Because	the	simple	supply-curve	model	is	a	“fundamental”	model,	which	builds	up	the	prices	from	characteristics	of	supply	and	demand,	the	actual	prices	from	major	trading	hubs	are	used	only	to	validate	the	model,	not	as	parameters	in	the	model	itself.		That	said,	refinements	to	the	simple	supply-curve	model	were	needed	to	improve	the	agreement	between	the	average	modeled	and	average	actual	prices.		In	PJM,	for	example,	actual	average	prices	at	the	“Western”	hub	could	not	be	replicated	without	splitting	PJM	into	two	regions,	as	described	more	in	Appendix	A.	23	Some	of	the	markets	saw	major	design	changes	between	2008	and	2017.		In	particular,	several	markets	did	not	have	centrally	organized	wholesale	markets	in	the	earlier	years	of	this	period.		As	such	no	comparison	of	DA	and	modeled	prices	was	possible	for	2008	for	CAISO,	ERCOT,	and	SPP,	and	for	2012	for	SPP.		All	markets	had	DA	and	RT	prices	by	2017.		Another	important	market	evolution	for	CAISO	was	the	introduction	of	the	Energy	Imbalance	Market	(EIM),	which	enabled	RT	balancing	with	utilities	outside	of	CAISO	starting	in	2015.		The	fundamental	model	considers	only	CAISO	generation	and	loads	and	does	not	include	the	broader	EIM.	
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One limitation of this approach is that average wholesale prices are not a linear function of all the 
factors that affect prices.  Owing to these non-linearities, the sum of the price impacts from changing 
factors individually will be different than the aggregate impact from changing all factors simultaneously.  
This analysis therefore also explores the magnitude of the interaction between factors and the 
implications of this interaction for disentangling the relative contribution of different factors to the 
observed price decline.  The interaction term only captures differences between changing factors 
individually relative to the impacts of changing all factors simultaneously; it does not capture impacts of 
factors that might be missing from the model that would lead to differences between modeled and 
actual prices (shown in Figure 3).  As a result, even a model that more accurately estimates wholesale 
prices would still likely face the same issue of non-linear interactions inhibiting the ability to disentangle 
the impacts of individual factors. 
 
Finally, EIA projections of key factors—including fuel prices, wind and solar growth, generation 
additions and retirement, and demand—are input to the supply curve model to estimate future average 
wholesale prices in 2022.  By again changing factors individually, this analysis can estimate the relative 
impact of these changing factors on wholesale power prices in the relatively near future. 
 
 Impact	of	VRE	growth	on	annual	average	wholesale	prices		
With low natural gas prices and a relatively flat supply curve in 2017, the impact of VRE growth 
between 2008 and 2017 on average wholesale prices was relatively small in all seven markets (less than 
-$2.2/MWh).24 The magnitude of the estimated impact primarily depends on the incremental level of 
VRE penetration, where a higher share of VRE leads to a greater impact on prices (Figure 4).  Across all 
markets and types of VRE, each incremental increase in VRE penetration reduced average annual 
wholesale prices in 2017 by approximately $0.14/MWh/% penetration. 
 
At low penetration (where annual generation from VRE is less than 5% of demand), the impact of wind 
and solar on average annual wholesale prices is similar across all markets.  Even at higher penetrations 
(5%–25%), the impact of wind appears to depend more on the penetration level than on regional 
variations in the composition of the power system.  The impact of higher solar penetration in the CAISO 
system, however, stands out as having a disproportionally large impact on average prices—perhaps 
foreshadowing greater impacts from solar in other regions as solar penetrations grow.  The relatively 
greater impact of solar in CAISO relative to the similar share of wind in ERCOT is driven by solar more 
frequently shifting the net demand in the steeper part of the supply curve and therefore having a larger 
impact on prices with and without solar.  The alignment with the steeper part of the supply curve is due 
to solar in California reducing net demand during summer afternoons, when marginal generators tend 
to be less-efficient peaker plants.  Wind in ERCOT, on the other hand, is less likely to reduce net 
 24	The	impact	of	wind	and	solar	were	assessed	individually	rather	than	the	combined	impact	of	wind	and	solar,	because	the	impacts	of	wind	can	be	distinctly	different	from	the	impacts	of	solar.		Most	regions	tend	to	be	dominated	by	one	technology	or	the	other,	with	the	exception	of	CAISO,	which	has	significant	wind	and	solar.		The	combined	impact	of	wind	and	solar	would	be	about	-$2.6/MWh	in	CAISO.	
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demand on summer afternoons and more likely to reduce it in the evening when the supply curve is 
flat.  More generally, the impact of VRE on wholesale prices is expected to be greater where VRE 
generation tends to be more concentrated at times when the supply curve is steep.  The supply curve 
tends to be steeper at times of high net demand (e.g., summer afternoons and evenings in many 
markets), times when marginal fuel prices are high (e.g., periods with high natural gas prices due to 
high gas demand and limited capacity in the U.S. Northeast), or even when the net demand is very low 
and negative bids become marginal. 
Figure	4.	Impact	of	VRE	growth	between	2008	and	2017	on	annual	average	wholesale	power	energy	
prices	in	each	ISO/RTO.	
 
VRE = variable renewable energy 
 
 Impact	of	other	factors	on	annual	average	wholesale	prices	
This analysis applies the model to possible price drivers other than VRE, demonstrating that—across all 
seven markets—changing natural gas prices had the largest impact on wholesale electricity prices 
between 2008 and 2017, far greater than the impact of VRE or any other factor (Figure 5).  Not 
surprisingly, the impact of changing natural gas prices was highest in markets where natural gas-fired 
generators remained marginal in the supply stack even with higher gas prices (CAISO, ERCOT, PJM, 
NYISO, and ISO-NE).  In contrast, the impact of high natural gas prices in 2008 (compared with 2017) on 
wholesale electricity prices was more muted in SPP and MISO, where it is likely that coal plants were 
often the marginal units owing to their relatively low variable costs. 
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Figure	5.	Average	wholesale	power	energy	price	impacts	of	various	factors	that	changed	between	
2008	and	2017	across	all	markets.25,26	
 
Second-tier price influences included growth in VRE, thermal power plant additions and retirements, 
coal prices, emissions prices, heat rates, demand, imports, and hydropower.  Additions of new thermal 
power plants between 2008 and 2017 lowered wholesale prices, particularly in CAISO, ERCOT, PJM, and 
NYISO.  Retirements of existing power plants, on the other hand, increased prices, particularly in 
CAISO.27 The CAISO power plants that retired over this period included the 2.3-GW SONGS nuclear 
 25	The	individual	factors	are	ordered	along	the	x-axis,	with	factors	having	the	most	negative	impact	on	wholesale	prices	on	the	left	and	least	negative	impact	on	the	right.	26	The	wholesale	price	impacts	of	wind	and	solar	are	not	combined	into	a	single	factor,	because	it	appears	there	are	distinct	differences	between	the	impacts	of	these	two	types	of	VRE.	27	The	impact	of	thermal	retirements	on	wholesale	prices	with	2017	as	a	base	year	is	measured	based	on	comparing	the	wholesale	prices	calculated	for	2017	with	the	wholesale	prices	if	no	thermal	retirements	occurred	between	2008	and	2017	(in	effect	simulating	the	price	impacts	of	the	excess	generation).		In	contrast,	the	effect	of	thermal	retirements	on	wholesale	prices	with	2008	as	a	base	year	is	simulated	by	comparing	wholesale	prices	calculated	for	2008	with	the	wholesale	prices	if	all	generation	that	retired	between	2008	and	2017	were	removed	from	the	generation	stack.		As	with	other	factors,	larger	effects	are	found	when	using	2008	as	the	base	year	(described	in	Appendix	C).		In	this	case,	the	impacts	are	not	only	due	to	the	steeper	supply	curve	with	higher	natural	gas	prices,	but	also	they	are	due	to	the	asymmetry	associated	with	the	consequences	of	too	little	generation	capacity	(leading	to	some	periods	with	very	high	scarcity	prices	of	$1,000/MWh)	compared	with	too	much	generation	capacity	(leading	to	only	slightly	lower	prices).		Thus,	the	impacts	of	thermal	retirements	have	small	impacts	on	prices	with	a	base	year	of	2017	and	much	greater	impacts	with	a	base	year	of	2008.		One	exception	is	that	CAISO	sees	large	price	impacts	of	thermal	retirements	even	with	a	base	year	of	2017.		This	is	due	to	one	of	the	major	retirements	over	this	period	being	the	SONGS	nuclear	plant,	which	contributes	to	some	periods	with	very	low	prices	at	the	assumed	negative	bid	of	-$10/MWh	in	CAISO.	
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power plant and more than 7 GW of natural gas-fired power plants.  Higher coal prices in 2017 
compared to 2008 increased prices in SPP, MISO, and ERCOT.  Changing emissions prices between 2008 
and 2017 had a mixed impact on wholesale electricity prices.  NOx and SO2 prices declined over this 
period, lowering wholesale prices in markets like MISO and PJM.  On the other hand, the variable costs 
of fossil-fuel generators in CAISO, NYISO, and ISO-NE increased with the creation of emission permits 
for CO2 in these markets; this is especially true for CAISO.  Reductions in the heat rate of power plants 
(i.e., increases in power plant efficiency) decreased wholesale prices, particularly in NYISO.  Decreases 
in demand lowered wholesale prices in ISO-NE, while increases in demand increased prices in ERCOT.  
Changes in hydropower (captured by historical variations in precipitation) and imports (driven by 
monthly imports reported by EIA) similarly increased or decreased wholesale prices by small amounts.  
Changes in petroleum prices, uranium prices, and other fuel prices all had negligible impacts on 
wholesale prices, as did growth in forms of renewable energy (RE) other than wind, solar, and 
hydropower. 
 
 
 Drivers	of	the	decline	in	wholesale	power	energy	prices	between	2008	
and	2017	
The relative contribution of each factor to the observed decline in wholesale prices between 2008 and 
2017 is shown in Figure 6 and Figure 7.  Owing to non-linearities, the sum of changes in wholesale 
prices from individual factors does not equal the change in prices from changing all factors 
simultaneously, leading to an interaction term, described further below. 
 
Across all markets, the largest individual contributor to the decline in average annual wholesale prices 
between 2008 and 2017 was the fall in natural gas prices over the same period.  Of the second-tier 
factors, some offset each other.  For example, the decrease in wholesale prices in CAISO, MISO, and 
ISO-NE due to thermal generation additions was largely offset by the increase in prices due to 
retirements.  In the other markets, however, the price reduction from thermal generation additions was 
larger than the price increase associated with retirements, leading to a net reduction in wholesale 
prices.  In CAISO, NYISO, and ISO-NE, meanwhile, the decline in wholesale prices due to wind and solar 
was smaller than the increase in prices due to CO2 emission permits. 
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Figure	6.	Relative	contribution	of	different	factors	to	the	observed	wholesale	power	energy	price	
decline	between	2008	and	2017	for	each	ISO/RTO.	
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Figure	7.	Summary	of	wholesale	power	energy	price	impact	of	various	factors	that	changed	between	
2008	and	2017	across	all	markets.	
 
RE = renewable energy 
 
The large interaction terms relative to the overall decline in wholesale prices in some markets, 
particularly SPP and MISO, illustrate limits on the ability to disentangle the relative contribution of 
individual factors to the observed decline in wholesale prices.  In SPP, for example, summing the 
impacts of all individual factors leads to a net price decline of $6.7/MWh, whereas changing all of the 
factors simultaneously leads to a price decline of $18.6/MWh.  Owing to the interaction of multiple 
factors, the combined impact of each individual factor understates the combined price decline by 
$11.9/MWh.  One source of interactions between multiple factors is due to changes in the net demand 
at the same time as changes in the slope of the supply curve, as explained in Appendix B. 
 
In some cases, the strong interactions are largely attributed to interactions between increasing wind 
and changes in the slope of the supply curve due to changes in natural gas prices.  Again using the 
example of SPP, the sum of the individual contributions of wind and natural gas to wholesale prices was 
$8.0/MWh, while the impact of changing wind and natural gas simultaneously was $14.9/MWh.  The 
interaction of wind and natural gas is therefore almost two thirds of the overall interaction observed in 
SPP.  Similar interactions between wind and natural gas were observed in ERCOT and MISO.  As 
explained in Appendix B, interactions were less likely to occur when changes in natural gas prices simply 
shifted the supply curve up or down without significantly changing the slope.  This situation often 
occurred when natural gas-fired generation was primarily the marginal generator over the year, 
irrespective of the natural gas price (e.g., CAISO). 
 
Another consequence of interactions between factors is that estimates of the magnitude of the 
wholesale price impacts of individual factors depend on the choice of base year.  The previous results 
began with the system as it was in 2017 and changed one factor at a time to its 2008 levels.  For most 
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regions, the low natural gas prices in 2017 meant that the supply curve was relatively flat, muting the 
impacts of various factors on wholesale prices.  Alternatively, the analysis could have started with the 
system as it was in 2008 and changed individual factors to their 2017 levels.  In this case, the 
considerably steeper supply curve in 2008 amplifies the impact of individual factors.  For example, had 
things remained the same as in 2008, with a very steep supply curve in many regions, the impact on 
average prices of increasing VRE from 2008 to 2017 levels could have been as much as five times higher 
(a price decrease of up to $12.5/MWh instead of $2.2/MWh).  Not only would VRE impacts have been 
greater, but also the impact of nearly all other factors would have been greater (Appendix C).  Using a 
2008 base year therefore overstates the contribution of individual factors, and it leads to an interaction 
term with the opposite sign. 
 
The impact of VRE on average wholesale prices found in the previous literature (Table 1) is sometimes 
larger than the maximum impact of $2.6/MWh found in this analysis.  In some cases, this can be 
explained by a different choice of base year.  Haratyk (2017), for example, uses a 2008 base year and 
changes individual factors to their 2015 levels.  In other cases, the period for the analysis includes years 
with higher gas prices and therefore a steeper supply curve.  Quint and Dahlke (2019) find that the 
marginal impact of wind in MISO has declined with time as the supply curve has flattened.  In other 
instances, of course, differences may be caused by the use of a simplified fundamental model, as 
opposed to regression models used in much of the other literature.  Specifically, the simplified supply-
curve model may not be fully capturing price impacts that occur at the tails of the distribution, a 
possibility supported by the model’s relative underperformance in estimating the volatility in hourly 
pricing.  Finally, differences may exist owing to improper or imprecise methods used in some of the 
previous literature, or because of inaccuracies in interpreting the results of that literature as presented 
in Table 1. 
 
 
 Post	shale-gas	boom	price	impacts:	2012	to	2017	
Since 2008, annual average natural gas prices have fallen and remained at much lower levels, whereas 
shares of VRE generation have expanded rapidly in some markets.  Here the analysis examines the 
relative impacts of different factors on wholesale prices over a period with low gas prices and relatively 
stable wholesale prices: 2012–2017.  The results of the analysis, conducted in the same fashion as the 
earlier results for 2008–2017, are presented in Figure 8. 
 
Overall, the net impact of all factors considered was to either modestly increase (ERCOT) or modestly 
decrease (all other regions) annual average prices.  Even though natural gas prices were on average 
much lower in 2012 than in 2008, natural gas prices were still the largest driver of changes in wholesale 
prices in some regions from 2012 to 2017.  In CAISO and ERCOT, natural gas prices increased between 
2012 and 2017 increasing wholesale prices.  In contrast, natural gas prices decreased in NYISO between 
2012 and 2017 thereby reducing wholesale prices. 
 
Factors that decreased prices on par with the estimated VRE impacts include thermal generation 
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additions (PJM, CAISO, and ERCOT), decreases in coal prices (PJM and MISO), and more precipitation 
and therefore hydropower production (CAISO).  Factors other than natural gas price changes that 
increased wholesale prices include higher coal prices in ERCOT, less precipitation and therefore less 
hydropower production in NYISO, marginal combined-cycle units in CAISO and ISO-NE that were less 
efficient28 in 2017 than in 2012, generation retirements in ISO-NE, higher emissions prices in NYISO and 
ISO-NE, and increased demand in ERCOT. 
Figure	8.	Price	impact	of	various	factors	that	changed	between	2012	and	2017	across	all	markets.	
 
RE = renewable energy 
 
 Outlook	for	wholesale	power	energy	prices	and	price	drivers	to	2022	
EIA modeled projections29 of demand, VRE growth, thermal additions, thermal retirements, and fuel 
price changes (along with regional projections of changes in CO2 emissions prices30), were input to the 
supply curve model to estimate changes to wholesale electricity prices between 2017 and 2022 for all 
seven markets (Figure 9).31 The major contributors to the increase in wholesale electricity prices vary by 
region, though EIA’s modeled projection of the increase in natural gas prices is consistently one of the 
 28	These	changes	in	efficiency	between	years	are	based	on	changes	in	the	heat	rate	of	individual	plants.		Overall,	the	fleet	of	combined-cycle	units	has	become	more	efficient	over	time	as	new	units	with	high	efficiency	have	been	added.			29	All	EIA	projections	are	based	on	the	2018	Annual	Energy	Outlook	(AEO)	reference	case	(EIA	2018b).		Details	of	EIA’s	projected	changes	are	included	in	Appendix	D.	30	EIA	does	not	present	regional	CO2	emissions	prices	in	the	AEO.		CO2	emissions	price	assumptions	from	the	California	Energy	Commission	for	CAISO	(CEC	2018)	and	RGGI	prices	from	NYISO	for	ISO-NE	and	NYISO	(Cohen	2018)	were	used	instead.			31	As	described	earlier,	the	interaction	term	represents	the	difference	between	the	sum	of	individual	impacts	and	the	impact	of	changing	all	factors	simultaneously.		It	does	not	represent	any	differences	between	factors	captured	in	the	model	and	factors	that	might	be	left	out	of	the	model	that	lead	to	inaccuracies	relative	to	actual	prices.		As	such,	an	interaction	term	can	be	estimated	for	future	prices	in	the	same	way	that	the	interaction	term	is	estimated	for	historical	prices.	
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largest contributors.  Increases in carbon prices in California and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
(RGGI), as projected by planners in each of those regions, contribute to the increases in wholesale 
prices in CAISO, ISO-NE, and NYISO.  EIA’s modeled projection of increases in coal prices leads to 
notable increases in wholesale prices in MISO, ERCOT, and SPP.  The increase in prices due to EIA’s 
modeled projection of the retirement of thermal generation is substantial in CAISO and NYISO.  Finally, 
EIA’s modeled projection of increases in electricity demand increases wholesale prices modestly in most 
regions. 
 
EIA’s modeled projection of growth in VRE, on the other hand, mitigates the price increases, particularly 
in the case of solar growth in California.  EIA’s modeled projection of VRE growth results in a doubling of 
the solar penetration in California between 2017 and 2022, leading to several instances in the simple 
supply-curve model where net demand is less than minimum generation levels for nuclear and 
combined-heat-and-power units.  Prices in these hours are therefore set by the assumed negative bid 
price for curtailing renewables.  Because this future negative bid price is uncertain, the CAISO results 
are shown both assuming curtailment occurs at a price of zero and assuming curtailment occurs only 
when prices are below -$10/MWh. 
 
The estimated impact of solar on wholesale prices in California far exceeds the anticipated impact of 
wind and solar in all other markets, even with solar curtailment assumed to occur at a price of 
$0/MWh.  In most other regions, the decrease in average wholesale prices from wind and solar is on 
par with or less than the decrease in prices due to thermal generation additions. 
 
These results are based on a simple supply-curve model and EIA’s reference case modeled projections 
for the change in various possible price drivers to 2022.  The results should not be construed as precise 
forecasts for future regional wholesale prices or price trajectories.  In particular, the lack of storage in 
the simple supply-curve model will tend to overstate the magnitude of the impact of growth in solar. 
Figure	9.	Average	wholesale	power	energy	price	impact	of	various	factors	that	are	expected	to	change	
between	2017	and	2022	across	all	markets. 
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Many factors can impact generation expansion and retirement decisions—including expansion of VRE—
across U.S. markets, making it difficult to rely on only one source for future projections.  Projections 
from other sources (e.g., BNEF 2018) include considerably greater wind and solar deployment in most 
markets than does EIA’s reference case by 2022.  One major exception is that Bloomberg New Energy 
Finance (BNEF) projects less wind and solar growth in CAISO than projected in EIA’s reference case.  The 
BNEF projections for utility-scale solar and wind are more in line with planned projects cataloged in 
ABB’s Velocity Suite, an electric industry data aggregation service.  Analysis in Appendix E shows that 
using generation expansion and retirement projections for 2022 from ABB’s Velocity Suite, 32 as an 
alternative to the EIA’s reference case, results in overall similar conclusions as presented above.  The 
primary differences in the alternative case are smaller impacts of solar in CAISO and greater impacts of 
wind relative to impacts based on EIA’s modeled projections, particularly in SPP, NYISO, and ERCOT.  
The greater impact of wind in the alternative case is in part due to more frequent negative prices with 
the growth of wind.  Solar growth in CAISO still has the greatest impact on decreasing prices.  However, 
other factors that tend to increase prices (e.g., natural gas prices, emission prices, and thermal 
retirements) are still overall greater, leading to a net wholesale price increase in each market between 
2017 and 2022.  
 32	Details	of	the	alternative	2022	case	using	ABB	Velocity	Suite	data	can	be	found	in	Appendix	D.	
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4. Impacts	of	VRE	on	Geographic	and	Temporal	Variations	in	
Wholesale	Power	Energy	Prices	
The previous section highlights the contribution of VRE to observed changes in average, annual market-
wide wholesale prices at the ISO/RTO level.  Because that analysis is based on a simple supply-curve 
model, it cannot capture more granular changes in the distribution of prices, changes in the temporal 
patterns of prices, and changes in the geographic patterns of prices.  To complement that analysis, this 
section examines historical wholesale pricing trends and VRE impacts at smaller regional and local levels 
through analysis of historical patterns of nodal wholesale power energy prices, with a particular focus 
on temporal trends in pricing and especially negative wholesale prices.  Nodes are specific locations in 
the power grid where prices for energy are established for generation or demand.  Nodal wholesale 
power energy prices are commonly referred to as LMPs. 
 
How wholesale prices change over time, such as during a day, can be of major importance to a current 
or prospective generator owner.  For example, some types of generation are dependent on infrequent 
price spikes during peak demand times to earn much of their annual revenue, thus assuring economic 
viability for a resource that may also be needed to operate when VRE generation is not available or for 
reliability purposes. 
 
Though the analysis briefly explores geographic trends in annual average prices and trends in the 
overall distribution of prices, the special focus on negative wholesale prices is motivated by the 
correlation between zero-marginal-cost generation (such as VRE) and the frequency of negative prices.  
Thus, tracking the incidences of negative prices, and the impacts of such prices, can provide insight into 
the impacts of VRE on overall wholesale prices and general market trends.  Furthermore, while the 
choice of prices below $0/MWh is somewhat arbitrary, it is a threshold used commonly in other 
literature, and it signifies periods in which oversupply of generation is a challenge.  However, not all 
incidences of negative prices originate from VRE, and the detailed nodal analysis conducted here can 
help separate VRE price impacts from the influence of other drivers.  Finally, the nodal analysis in this 
section helps illustrate how negative prices have differentially occurred at pricing nodes associated with 
different types of electricity generators. 
 
This section is split into five topical areas: 
(1) Macro trends across the United States: Overall pricing trends, how negative prices vary across the 
United States and over time, the impact of negative prices on annual average prices and on 
different generator types, and the degree to which negative prices occur system wide or are more 
localized. 
(2) Impact of wind on prices: The correlation between negative prices and wind power generation, and 
what other types of power plants are generating during negative-price hours. 
(3) Impact of solar on prices: The impacts of solar on diurnal and seasonal pricing patterns and on 
negative prices in California, and examine other drivers of changes to pricing patterns. 
(4) Hydropower contribution to negative prices: The role of hydropower in driving negative prices in 
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the Northwest. 
(5) Transmission expansion and negative prices: Negative prices in two locations (ERCOT and Northern 
Illinois) before and after transmission expansion. 
 
The analysis emphasizes hourly wholesale power energy pricing patterns at more than 60,000 pricing 
nodes across the United States, focusing on centrally organized markets.  Some of the analysis includes 
DA prices, but the focus is primarily on RT prices where the impacts of VRE are more readily observed.  
DA prices are most relevant to inflexible plants that only sell power in the DA market and do not 
participate in RT balancing (e.g., nuclear and some coal units).  RT prices, on the other hand, reflect the 
value (or cost) of generation deviating from its DA schedule to support (or hinder) real-time balancing 
between supply and demand.33  
 
On average, DA market prices tend to track average RT market prices.  For example, across a set of 
major trading hubs,34 the average RT price was $2.5/MWh lower35 to $0.6/MWh higher (8% lower to 
2% higher) than the average DA price in 2017.  As a result, even if negative prices are more common in 
the RT market than in the DA market, negative RT prices are anticipated to affect longer-term average 
pricing in the DA market (Bajwa and Cavicchi 2017).  On the other hand, the volatility of RT prices is 
persistently higher than the volatility of DA prices.  This higher volatility is expected, because fewer 
options are available in RT to resolve issues that appear after the close of the DA market, including 
generator and transmission outages, load and renewable forecast errors, and other unforeseen 
changes.  Fewer options are available owing to the lead time necessary to start and stop units and 
limitations in the ramping capability of units.  With fewer options available, RT outcomes that differ 
from DA expectations can lead to higher or lower prices in RT and hence higher volatility.  Finally, all of 
the ISOs/RTOs now use 5-minute markets for RT balancing, and FERC now requires RT settlements to 
occur over the same interval as used for dispatch.  This analysis, however, is based on hourly averages 
of those RT prices, in part because only hourly data are reported in the main data source, ABB’s Velocity 
Suite.  The volatility of 5-minute prices would likely be greater than the volatility of hourly averages of 
the RT prices. 
 
 
 
 
33 The	participation	of	generation	in	RT	balancing	and	volume	of	transactions	varies	between	markets.		CAISO,	for	example,	reports	that—in	2017—two	thirds	of	the	load	could	be	met	by	generation	that	was	self-scheduled	in	the	RT	market,	and	most	of	the	self-schedules	in	RT	were	carried	over	from	schedules	resulting	from	the	DA	market	(CAISO	2018,	102).		The	ERCOT	market	monitor	estimates	that	90%	of	the	RT	load	was	hedged	through	DA	market	purchases	(Potomac	Economics	2018a,	ix).		The	PJM	market	monitor	finds	that,	in	2017,	27.5%	of	the	RT	load	was	met	through	RT	market	purchases	rather	than	through	self-scheduled	generators	or	bilateral	contracts	(Monitoring	Analytics	2018,	126).		SPP	appears	to	have	the	greatest	reliance	on	the	DA	market,	with	98%	of	load	purchased	in	that	market	(SPP	2018a,	107). 34	This	comparison	of	average	RT	and	DA	prices	uses	prices	from	SP15	(CAISO),	North	Hub	(ERCOT),	South	Hub	(SPP),	Indiana	Hub	(MISO),	Western	Hub	(PJM),	Hudson	Valley,	Zone	G	(NYISO),	and	Mass.	Hub	(ISO-NE).		35	In	2017,	RT	prices	were	the	greatest	amount	below	DA	prices	in	CAISO	at	the	SP15	trading	hub.		
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 Macro	trends	across	the	United	States	
4.1.1 Variation	in	real-time	wholesale	power	energy	prices	between	nodes	
Average annual RT prices (LMPs) varied significantly from node to node across the United States in 2017 
(Figure 10).36 LMPs were lowest in the Midwest region, where wind generation has grown substantially, 
along with regions like Upstate New York and Northern Maine.  LMPs were also low in the hydropower-
rich Pacific Northwest, which also has substantial wind generation.  LMPs in California, which has 
significant solar, were higher, as they were in most other regions of the country.  The variation in 
average annual DA prices (not included in figure form) follows a similar geographic distribution as the 
RT prices, though with less variation from node to node. 
Figure	10.	Average	RT	LMP	at	each	U.S.	node	in	2017.	
 
LMP = locational marginal price 
 
Larger than the variation in average prices across different parts of the United States were the 
differences in high prices or low prices (Figure 11).  From 2006–2016, the variation in high prices from 
node to node (represented by the 95th percentile of RT prices at each node for the respective year) was 
greater than the variation across nodes in median or low prices (represented by the 5th percentile of 
prices at each node).  In 2017, however, the variation in low prices across nodes was greater than the 
variation in high prices.  Further, more than a quarter of all pricing nodes had low prices that were 
negative in 2017.  This suggests that recent growth in VRE may have had a greater impact on the low 
prices at some locations than it had on high prices or median prices.  In part as a result, much of the 
 36	Transparent	LMPs	are	only	available	from	the	seven	centrally	organized	wholesale	power	markets,	which	do	not	cover	all	parts	of	the	United	States.		Particularly	absent	are	the	Southeast	and	the	non-California	West.		The	points	in	the	West	outside	of	CAISO	are	based	on	interface	nodes	with	CAISO	or,	in	more	recent	years,	on	EIM	nodes.		The	points	in	the	Southeast	are	based	on	interface	nodes	with	PJM	or	MISO.	
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following analysis will focus on the growing share of negative prices and the degree to which VRE has 
been the driver of these negative prices.  Negative prices are not uniquely interesting for understanding 
impacts of VRE on prices.  Nonetheless, a price below $0/MWh is a convenient cutoff for signaling times 
when the supply of power exceeded demand at particular locations, and it is therefore a common 
feature in other discussions about the impact of VRE on wholesale power markets. 
Figure	11.	Distribution	of	RT	LMPs	across	nodes	for	the	5th,	50th,	and	95th	percentile	of	prices	within	a	
node	(in	2017$).	
 
 
4.1.2 Increases	in	the	frequency	of	negative	prices		
The percentage of nodes with negative RT prices during 5% or more of all hours grew rapidly between 
2015 and 2017, though some years in the 2009–2012 period also had a substantial percentage of nodes 
with frequent occurrences of negative prices (Figure 12).  As discussed below, the frequent negative 
prices in the 2009–2012 period were driven in part by limited transmission in the wind-rich region of 
West Texas prior to the CREZ transmission expansion as well as high hydropower levels in the West.  
The prevalence of nodes with negative DA prices during 5% or more of all hours followed a similar 
pattern, albeit with much smaller percentages of such nodes. 
Figure	12.	Percentage	of	nodes	with	more	than	5%	of	hourly	LMPs	being	negative.	
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Figure	13.	Frequency	of	negative	RT	LMPs	at	each	U.S.	node	for	2011,	2015,	and	2017.	
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The price nodes with high percentages of negative LMPs tend to cluster in specific regions rather than 
being evenly dispersed (Figure 13).  Often, the nodes with greater incidences of negative prices are near 
large amounts of VRE, though—as shown in subsequent parts of Section 4—VRE was not the only 
contributor to negative prices.  In 2011, negative prices were clustered in the West Texas region of 
ERCOT, featuring large amounts of wind and constrained transmission (mitigated in 2013 through the 
CREZ transmission projects); the wind-rich region around Iowa, Southern Minnesota, and Northern 
Illinois; and throughout California and neighboring states.  California had some wind and solar in 2011, 
though high hydropower and inflexible nuclear may have been greater contributors to negative prices 
in 2011 (see Section 4.3).  By 2015, negative prices were less frequent in California and Texas, though 
they persisted in Iowa and neighboring areas.  By 2017, negative prices were again very frequent in 
California, spilling out to other pricing nodes within the Energy Imbalance Market (EIM); pervasive 
across the wind-rich portions of SPP in Oklahoma, Kansas, and Nebraska; growing again across Texas; 
and starting to appear in the northern parts of New York, Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont, where 
wind deployment has occurred in transmission-constrained areas.  In some SPP areas in 2017, negative 
RT prices occurred in more than 20% of the hours of the year.  In California, most nodes experienced 
negative prices in at least 6% of the hours of the year. 
	
4.1.3 Impact	of	negative	prices	on	annual	average	prices	
Aside from the frequency of negative prices, the magnitude of negative prices was also larger in some 
regions than in others (Appendix F).  The more negative the prices were, the more they brought down 
the annual average price.  The reduction in annual average prices due to negative RT prices is shown in 
Figure 14.  Comparing Figure 13 to Figure 14 shows that, while negative prices were common in 
relatively large regions, the impact of negative prices on average annual prices was often very limited 
(less than 2% in the vast majority of cases) except in a few “hot spots.” The 2017 map illustrates the 
significant effect of negative prices on average prices in SPP in particular.  The region between Northern 
New York and Northern Maine as well as certain parts of California also stand out.  One interesting 
omission in 2017 is the disappearance of a hot spot in Northern Illinois.  As discussed in Section 4.5, this 
region had seen steadily increasing negative prices with notable impacts on average prices until 2016, 
but in 2017 no such hot spot was apparent. 
 
The regional clustering of negative prices means that not all generation has been equally affected.  
Negative prices led to the largest decrease in the average annual RT LMP at nodes where wind was 
located (negative prices decreased average prices at nodes with wind by about 6% on average in 2017) 
and increasingly at nodes near solar plants (by about 3% in 2017), as shown in Figure 15a.  Nodes near 
hydropower plants have also been affected (also by about 3% in 2017).  Pricing nodes near coal, gas, 
and nuclear plants saw less of a reduction in average annual RT LMPs due to negative prices (by about 
1.5% in 2017), though those modest impacts have slightly increased over time.  The sizable impact of 
negative prices in 2012, which primarily affected nodes near wind and hydropower, was largely due to 
frequent negative prices in the Pacific Northwest region during a high-hydropower year. 
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Figure	14.	Impact	of	negative	prices	on	average	RT	LMPs	at	each	U.S.	node	for	2011,	2015,	and	2017.	
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For most power plants, negative prices reduced average annual RT LMPs by less than $1/MWh in 2017 
(Figure 15b).  For a few wind plants, however, negative prices decreased average annual RT LMPs by 
$5–$15/MWh.  A small number of coal, gas, hydropower, and solar plants also saw reductions around 
$5/MWh.  Most locations at which negative prices significantly reduced average annual LMPs were near 
wind, solar, or hydropower plants rather than near other generation types. 
Figure	15.	Decrease	in	average	RT	LMPs	due	to	negative	prices	weighted	by	generation	capacity	
associated	with	each	node	in	(a)	percent	and	(b)	absolute	terms.	
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
LMP = locational marginal price 
 
Even though incidences of negative prices signify the system value of power at particular times and 
locations, they do not always directly impact the revenues earned by generators.  Some generators are 
hedged from market prices through long-term bilateral contracts (e.g., power-purchase agreements 
commonly used by wind and solar plants), and some interact only with the DA market and do not 
participate in RT balancing.  Flexible generators that reduce their output from DA schedules may earn 
more revenues by responding when RT prices are negative.  On the other hand, wind and solar 
generators that only participate in the RT market or have more RT generation than scheduled in the DA 
market will see a reduction in revenue with negative prices that are correlated with their output.  For a 
merchant baseload generator that runs at a constant output, the impact of negative prices on potential 
revenues depends on how well reductions in average RT prices translate to reductions in average DA 
prices.  Strong convergence between average DA and RT prices will lead to negative prices in the RT 
market impacting the revenues of merchant baseload generators. 
	
4.1.4 Correlation	of	negative	prices	within	each	market		
In 2017, the nodal negative prices in CAISO and ISO-NE were more tightly correlated over time and 
geography than those in ERCOT, MISO, PJM, SPP, and NYISO (Figure 16b).  This suggests that events that 
drove negative prices in CAISO and ISO-NE in 2017 were more likely to be system-wide events, e.g., 
minimum generation levels.  In contrast, events that drove negative prices in other regions in 2017 
were more likely to reflect localized issues, e.g., transmission congestion. 
 
To illustrate causes of system-wide or localized negative pricing events, this analysis examines the 
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history of negative price correlation within four areas: CAISO, ISO-NE, ERCOT, and SPP37 (Figure 16a).  In 
CAISO, nodal negative pricing events correlated well with each other since 2011.  This suggests that 
transmission within CAISO is relatively well developed and that surplus generation in one region of 
CAISO can affect all of CAISO, with limited cases of extreme congestion.  This is true across years except 
2015, when it appears in Figure 13 that negative prices were more common in Southern California and 
less common in Northern California.  A likely contributor to the divergence between Northern and 
Southern California in 2015 was planned transmission outages on a major transmission path (Path 15) 
connecting the two parts of the state (CAISO 2015). 
 
In ISO-NE, negative bids were not allowed prior to December 2014, and the relatively few instances of 
negative prices before this date could therefore only occur owing to local congestion (Robinson 2014).  
In contrast, after December 2014, nearly all of the negative price events simultaneously occurred at all 
nodes in ISO-NE.  Low load and significant shares of generation from inflexible nuclear characterized 
these system-wide negative price events (see Appendix G).  By 2017, there were increasing examples of 
negative prices occurring over a much smaller subset of nodes (less than about one quarter of the 
nodes in the system), primarily in the northern region where Figure 13 and Figure 14 show frequent and 
impactful negative prices.  As shown in Section 4.2, these negative prices in the northern region of ISO-
NE correlated with periods of high wind output.  In addition to these somewhat confined negative 
prices, there were more than 100 hours of the year in 2017 (1.1% of the year) in which every node in 
the system had negative RT LMPs. 
 
In contrast to CAISO and ISO-NE, negative pricing events in SPP have rarely been well correlated across 
the region’s whole footprint.  This could be due to transmission limits between the wind-rich region of 
SPP and regions with greater load, causing localized congestion-based negative prices. 
 
Finally, negative pricing events in ERCOT have been well correlated in some years but not others.  
Specifically, negative pricing events were less correlated prior to the expansion of the transmission 
network in 2013 (CREZ), because transmission constraints limited negative pricing events to high-wind 
areas in West Texas.  Immediately after the expansion of the transmission network, the smaller number 
of remaining negative pricing events were well correlated across ERCOT.  However, as wind capacity 
continued to expand in West Texas, transmission began again to be a constraining factor, causing an 
increase in localized negative pricing events over the last several years. 
  
 37	For	clarity,	the	change	in	correlation	over	time	is	not	shown	for	the	other	ISOs/RTOs.		MISO	has	had	low	correlation	over	all	years	back	to	2011,	with	at	most	19%	of	negative	price	events	occurring	over	at	least	75%	of	nodes.		PJM	and	NYISO	had	relatively	few	negative	pricing	events	compared	to	the	other	markets.		In	PJM,	the	degree	of	correlation	has	been	moderate	in	all	years.		NYISO	had	significant	correlation	in	early	years,	but,	as	the	number	of	negative	pricing	events	has	increased	in	more	recent	years,	the	correlation	has	simultaneously	decreased.	
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Figure	16.	Measure	of	correlation	of	occurrences	of	negative	prices	across	an	ISO/RTO	(a)	over	time	
for	a	subset	of	ISOs/RTOs38	and	(b)	in	2017	for	all	ISOs/RTOs.	
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 Impact	of	wind	on	real-time	wholesale	power	energy	prices		
To further illustrate the role of wind generation in reducing wholesale power energy prices and in the 
incidences of negative prices, this analysis assesses the relationship between varying wind-generation 
levels and prices.  Because prices are also affected by changing load levels, the effects of load and wind 
on prices are simultaneously examined.  The region with the highest concentration of negative 
wholesale prices and the lowest average prices in 2017 is in the SPP footprint covering states in and 
around Oklahoma. 
 
Figure 17 shows that average RT LMPs in the Oklahoma region of SPP were low at times when overall 
system load (i.e., electricity demand) was low and higher when load was higher.39 More recently, and 
especially in 2017, the amount of overall SPP wind generation has also affected that relationship.  
Specifically, periods with high system-wide wind generation have been correlated with lower LMPs, 
particularly if the load was also simultaneously low.  The impact of wind on average LMPs appears to 
have become stronger over time, such that average LMPs in 2017 were low when the wind was 
strongest even when system-wide load was relatively high.  The SPP market monitor further highlights 
the role of wind being under-scheduled in the DA market relative to the RT market as a contributor to 
low RT prices during off-peak periods (SPP 2018a). 
  
 38	Not	all	of	the	ISOs/RTOs	are	included	here,	because	the	figure	would	become	cluttered	without	providing	additional	insight.	39	Overall	SPP	load	and	overall	SPP	wind	generation	were	used	owing	to	limitations	on	the	geographic	resolution	of	the	wind	and	load	data.	
	 	 	
Drivers of Wholesale Power Prices│37 
Figure	17.	Relationship	between	load,	wind,	and	average	RT	LMPs	around	Oklahoma	in	SPP	for	2011,	
2015,	and	2017.	
 
 
The lower average LMPs at times of high wind and low load were due to lower variable-cost resources 
being on the margin at those times.  In some cases, the net demand would be low enough during these 
times to lead to negative prices (Figure 18).  While negative prices were nearly nonexistent in the 
Oklahoma region of SPP in 2011, irrespective of system-wide load and wind generation, by 2017 
negative prices occurred in nearly 40% of the hours when wind was generating above 50% of its 
nameplate capacity and load was below 50% of its peak level.  Even when load was high in 2017, prices 
were sometimes negative when wind output was high.  In contrast, in 2015, negative prices were 
unlikely to occur if the demand was high, regardless of the level of wind generation. 
Figure	18.	Relationship	between	load,	wind,	and	negative	prices	around	Oklahoma	in	SPP	for	2011,	
2015,	and	2017.	
 
 
To be clear, wind was not the only resource generating at times of negative prices in SPP (Figure 19).  
Coal, nuclear, natural gas, and hydropower resources all generated significant amounts of power at 
times when the energy component of the SPP LMP was negative.  Nuclear plants, for example, 
generated the same amount of power when the price was negative or positive.  Coal, gas, and 
hydropower all decreased generation to some extent during negative price events, though they still 
operated at well above zero output.  These generators may be generating during negative price periods 
for several reasons.  First, as described in Section 2.4, many participants may not be responsive to spot 
prices and may be self-committing or self-dispatching generation.  Second, responsive resources may 
be ramp constrained such that there is not enough short-term ramp available to address the negative 
prices.  Third, resources may be sitting at minimum in order to ramp up to meet higher expected loads 
or to provide more ramp later in the day.  In contrast to resources that reduced output during periods 
of negative prices, wind generated relatively more during times of negative prices than during times of 
2011 2015 2017 
2011 2015 2017 
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positive prices.  Similar patterns of higher wind generation during times of negative prices were 
observed in ERCOT (Appendix G), illustrating the contribution of wind to these events. 
Figure	19.	Average	generation	levels	for	different	resources	in	SPP	at	times	when	the	energy	
component	of	the	SPP	RT	LMP	was	positive	or	negative.	
 
 
A similar relationship between wind and the frequency of negative prices is found in the MISO region 
near Iowa and Southern Minnesota, and in the region between Upstate New York and Northern Maine 
(Figure 20).  In these areas, lower average LMPs and negative prices were associated with times of low 
load and high wind generation.  The relationship between high wind and low load leading to negative 
prices is very clear in MISO, whereas negative prices in the northern regions of NYISO and ISO-NE often 
occurred when wind generation was high, even when the load was not at its lowest levels (i.e., negative 
prices are more evenly distributed along the vertical axis of the figure, indicating less of a relationship 
with the level of demand).  This pattern, along with the localized nature of negative prices shown earlier 
(Figure 13), suggests that local transmission constraints might have played a significant role in driving 
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negative prices in the northern regions of NYISO and ISO-NE.40 Analysis of resource-specific generation 
patterns during times when the energy component of LMPs was negative in each of these regions 
shows that wind was a small contributor to the overall energy mix, while several other generation types 
were generating sizable amounts of electricity (see Appendix G). 
Figure	20.	Relationship	between	load,	wind,	and	negative	prices	in	the	RT	market	in	the	Iowa	and	
Southern	Minnesota	region	of	MISO	(left),	Northern	New	York	(center),	and	the	Vermont	to	Maine	
region	of	ISO-NE	(right)	for	2017.	
 
 
 Impact	of	solar	on	real-time	wholesale	power	energy	prices	in	California	
The effect of solar on LMPs can best be seen in California.  Specifically, increased solar generation in 
California has shifted the diurnal profile of RT LMPs to be lower in the day and higher in the early 
evening, particularly in the spring months (Figure 21). 
 
While overall average LMPs did not change significantly between 2011 and 2017, midday prices in the 
spring were about $30/MWh lower in 2017 than they were for the same hours in 2011.  Summer 
evening LMPs in 2017, in contrast, were $40/MWh greater than in 2011.  These higher evening LMPs in 
the summer of 2017 were due to a small set of very-high-priced hours that occurred when load was 
greater than peak loads in 2011 and less nuclear plant generation was available than in 2011.  Increased 
renewable and thermal generation contributed to meeting this greater load.  The significant ramping 
needs due to the evening decline in solar output during periods of high demand may have also 
contributed to these price spikes, though most summer evenings in 2017 contained equally high net-
load ramps (but lower load) and did not correspond with similar price spikes.  In other seasons, there is 
evidence of early-evening price spikes due to the increased net-load ramp from declining solar output. 
  
 40	The	localized	nature	of	wind	impacts	on	negative	prices	is	further	supported	by	analysis	from	ISO-NE:	“Most	of	the	marginal	wind	generators	in	2017	were	located	where	the	transmission	system	is	regularly	export-constrained.		This	means	that	the	wind	generators	frequently	set	price	within	their	constrained	regions	while	another	resources(s)	set	price	for	the	rest	of	the	system.		Though	wind	was	marginal	19%	of	the	time	in	2017,	wind	was	the	single	marginal	fuel	type	on	the	system	in	<1%	of	all	five-minute	pricing	intervals”	(ISO-NE	2018).		
MISO NYISO ISONE 
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Figure	21.	Diurnal	profile	of	the	energy	component	of	RT	LMPs	in	CAISO	for	2011	and	2017.	
 
The decrease in 2017 LMPs during the daytime hours in the spring and winter was due in part to an 
increase in the frequency of daytime negative prices.  The distribution of negative prices over spring 
and winter days in 2017 clearly follows the pattern of solar generation (Figure 22).  In 2011, on the 
other hand, negative prices were more likely to occur during the night or early morning in spring and 
summer. 
Figure	22.	Diurnal	profile	of	negative	prices	in	CAISO	for	2011	and	2017.	
 
While it is clear that solar was a major contributor to negative prices in 2017, numerous additional 
factors have changed over the years in the California system leading to increased or decreased 
incidences of negative prices (Figure 23):  
 
• Hydropower: Hydropower generation was greatest in 2011 and 2017, both years with frequent 
negative prices.  Negative prices were much less frequent in 2015, when hydropower generation 
was lower.  The similar levels in average hydropower generation between positive- and negative-
price hours indicate that hydropower had limited flexibility to decrease generation during times of 
negative prices. 
• Nuclear: As with hydropower, constant levels of nuclear generation during positive- and negative-
price hours illustrate the limited flexibility of nuclear to reduce output during negative price events.  
At the start of 2012, the San Onofre nuclear generating station went offline, lowering the 
contribution of nuclear to negative prices. 
• Wind: Wind generation was greater during times of negative prices than during times of positive 
prices, though overall wind output was small relative to other generating sources. 
• Imports: The amount of imports showed little response to negative prices in 2011 and 2012.  By 
2017, however, the level of imports dropped considerably during negative-price hours.  The 
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growing persistence of negative prices and the introduction of the EIM may have incentivized 
structural changes allowing for increased flexibility in imports. 
• Thermal generation: Thermal generation was lower, though still not close to zero, during negative-
price hours.  As with imports, the level of thermal generation during negative-price hours was lower 
in 2017 compared to previous years, suggesting that increased flexibility is being accessed from the 
thermal fleet over time. 
• Load (depicted as the total height of the bars): Negative prices have tended to occur when load was 
low in all years.  The level of the load during negative-price hours remained relatively constant 
across all of the years, even though the frequency of negative prices varied considerably. 
Figure	23.	Generation	in	CAISO	during	hours	when	the	energy	component	of	the	RT	LMP	was	negative	
in	2011,	2012,	2015,	and	2017.	
 
RE = renewable energy 
 
 Hydropower	contribution	to	negative	prices	in	the	Pacific	Northwest	
The preceding discussion showcases that wind and solar contribute to negative wholesale prices but are 
not the only drivers, because various other types of power plants are also generating at times of 
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negative prices.  In 2011/2012, for example, high-hydropower conditions may have been the primary 
driver of negative wholesale prices in the Pacific Northwest.  While hydropower has many positive 
flexibility attributes, this finding suggests that those attributes have limits. 
 
Earlier, Figure 15a showed that in 2011/2012 negative prices significantly lowered average wholesale 
power energy prices at pricing nodes associated with hydropower and wind energy.  A major 
contributor to this spike was the increased prevalence of negative prices at nodes with significant 
hydropower and wind capacity in the Pacific Northwest.  Monthly EIA hydropower generation data 
show that hydropower generation reached peak levels across much of the hydropower-rich West in 
2011/2012. 
 
Analysis of data for Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), meanwhile, indicates that hydropower was 
generating nearly 2.5 GW more during times of negative prices than during positive-price hours in 2012 
(Figure 24).41,42 Wind in BPA was similarly generating more during negative-price hours, but only by a 
small amount (0.6 GW) compared to hydropower.  Because BPA load was also slightly lower during 
negative-price hours than during positive-price hours, BPA needed to export this extra generation, 
potentially contributing to region-wide low prices. 
Figure	24.	Comparison	of	average	generation	levels	during	positive-	and	negative-price	hours	at	BPA	
in	2011	and	2012.	
 
Note: Exports from BPA are represented by negative import values 
 
 Transmission	expansion	and	negative	prices	
As shown earlier in Figure 15, the impact of negative prices falls disproportionately on wind generators 
relative to coal, gas, and nuclear generation.  In some cases, negative prices are localized and can be 
addressed through expansion of the transmission system to better connect wind resources to loads.  
 41	Hourly	prices	are	determined	through	records	from	a	CAISO	interface	node	(SYLMARDC_2_N501)	located	within	BPA.		Generation	is	as	reported	by	BPA.	42	During	portions	of	these	years,	it	was	not	possible	to	spill	hydropower	owing	to	limits	on	dissolved	nitrogen,	for	which	excess	levels	can	adversely	impact	fish	downstream	of	dams	(EIA	2014).	
	 	 	
Drivers of Wholesale Power Prices│43 
Naturally, any benefit from the reduced prevalence of negative prices should be weighed against the 
costs and additional benefits of transmission expansions. 
 
One illustration of the relationship between growth in wind, increased incidences of negative prices, 
and mitigation through transmission expansion is in the western part of Texas, where major new 
transmission capacity was constructed between 2011 and 2013 (RS&H 2011; Lasher 2014; Du and Rubin 
2018).  In 2011, the frequency of negative prices at wind nodes (weighted by the average nearby wind 
capacity) in West Texas exceeded 15% of all hours in the RT market and 6% of all hours in the DA 
market.  Further east, at a major trading hub near Dallas (the North Hub), negative prices were 
nonexistent during the same hours (Figure 25). 
Figure	25.	Frequency	of	RT	and	DA	negative	prices	in	ERCOT	along	with	expansion	of	wind	capacity.43	
  
RT = real-time; DA = day-ahead  
	
As the CREZ transmission lines came online, negative prices were reduced to below 2% of hours at wind 
nodes in West Texas by 2014 (  
 43	The	frequency	of	DA	negative	prices	is	shown	in	front	of	the	frequency	of	RT	negative	prices,	rather	than	being	stacked	on	top	of	each	other.	
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Figure 26).44 By 2017, however, wind capacity in West Texas had nearly doubled from its level in 2011, 
approaching the 18.5-GW wind capacity design level for the CREZ lines.  As such, by 2017, negative 
prices—particularly at wind nodes—were again on the rise.  While the expansion of the transmission 
system between West Texas and the rest of the ERCOT system moderately increased the frequency of 
negative prices at the North Hub, they have remained below 2% of hours in all years shown. 
  
 44	Another	more	recent	example	of	transmission	expansion	relieving	incidences	of	negative	prices	is	in	the	western	portion	of	Oklahoma.		The	frequent	negative	prices	in	2017	were	mitigated	by	transmission	expansion	between	western	and	central	Oklahoma	(Woodward	–	Tatonga	–	Matthewson	345-kV	project)	that	came	online	in	February	2018	(SPP	2018b).	
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Figure	26.	Frequency	of	negative	prices	in	the	RT	market	in	2011	before	(left),	in	2014	after	
completion	of	the	CREZ	transmission	projects	(center),	and	in	2017	as	wind	growth	has	continued	in	
ERCOT.		State	and	ERCOT	boundary	lines	are	shown.	
     
 
Another area where transmission expansion has played a role in reducing the frequency of negative 
prices is in the ComEd zone of PJM in Northern Illinois.  This region includes more than 10 GW of 
nuclear plants and more than 3 GW of wind.  Two nuclear plants in the western part of the zone, Byron 
and Quad Cities, saw an increasing frequency of negative prices in both the RT and DA markets as wind 
capacity in ComEd grew.  The frequency of negative prices reached as high as 9% in the RT market and 
4% in the DA market in 2015 (Figure 27). 
Figure	27.	Frequency	of	RT	and	DA	negative	prices	in	PJM	and	wind	capacity	expansion.45		
 
RT = real-time; DA = day-ahead 
 45	As	with	Figure	25,	the	frequency	of	DA	negative	prices	is	shown	in	front	of	the	frequency	of	RT	negative	prices,	rather	than	being	stacked	on	top	of	each	other.	
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This effect was highly concentrated at the nuclear nodes, with a lower frequency of negative prices at 
the wind nodes in ComEd (capacity-weighted average) and at the Northern Illinois Hub.  Further to the 
east, negative prices were consistently less than 0.5% at the Western Hub in Pennsylvania.  By 2017, 
however, the relatively high share of negative prices at the Byron and Quad Cities plants was reduced 
to a level closer to the level of the wind nodes and the Northern Illinois Hub in the ComEd zone, also 
shown in Figure 28.  A key contributor to this development was the expansion of the PJM transmission 
network with the 345-kV Byron-Wayne line.  This transmission line improved the capacity of the 
transmission network between the nuclear plants and areas with greater load closer to Chicago (ComEd 
2013; Prosack 2017). 
Figure	28.	Frequency	of	negative	prices	in	the	RT	market	in	Northern	Illinois	in	2015	before	(left)	
and	in	2017	after	(right)	a	transmission	project	was	energized.	
   
  
2015
Frequency of
Negative Prices (%)
0 − 2
2 − 4
4 − 6
6 − 8
8 − 10
10 − 12
12 − 14
14 − 16
16 − 24
>24
2017
Frequency of
Negative Prices (%)
0 − 2
2 − 4
4 − 6
6 − 8
8 − 10
10 − 12
12 − 14
14 − 16
16 − 24
>24
2017
Frequency of
Negative Prices (%)
0 − 2
2 − 4
4 − 6
6 − 8
8 − 10
10 − 12
12 − 14
14 − 16
16 − 24
>242015
 
2017
 
IL
 
IL
 
IN
N
 
IN
N
 
	 	 	
Drivers of Wholesale Power Prices│47 
5. Conclusions		
Centrally organized wholesale power markets in the United States have evolved over time.  Some of the 
more notable recent trends include growth in wind and solar, a steep reduction in the price of natural 
gas, limited growth in electrical load, and an increase in the retirement of thermal power plants.  
Building on recent related work (Wiser et al. 2017), this report has assessed the degree to which growth 
in VRE has influenced wholesale power energy prices in the United States, not in isolation but in 
comparison to other possible drivers and focused on regions of the country that feature ISOs/RTOs. 
 
Across all U.S. ISO/RTO markets, the dominant driver of the decline in average wholesale prices 
between 2008 and 2017 was the fall in natural gas prices.  Even after the shale-gas boom caused a 
sustained reduction in natural gas prices, variability of natural gas prices continued to be the largest 
driver of changes in average wholesale prices—albeit sometimes increasing and sometimes decreasing 
prices. 
 
The impacts of wind and solar on market-wide average annual wholesale prices were secondary 
compared to the impacts of natural gas, but they were among the biggest drivers in a second tier of 
factors that also included expansion and retirement of other generation capacity, changes in demand, 
generator efficiency, variations in hydropower, and emissions prices.  The impact of wind and solar on 
average wholesale prices increased with their share of total generation.  Building on near-term 
projections from EIA, the impact of additional wind and solar on average wholesale prices will be similar 
to the impact of thermal generation additions, except in the case of additional solar in California.  The 
projected doubling of solar in California by 2022 is expected to have substantial impacts on average 
wholesale prices—perhaps foreshadowing larger impacts in other regions on a longer-term basis as 
solar penetrations grow.  Storage and other forms of flexibility could affect these results, but impact of 
storage on prices was not to captured in the simple supply-curve model. 
 
Beyond the impacts to market-wide average annual prices, VRE has had a more substantial impact on 
prices in some locations and in altering the temporal patterns of prices.  In particular, VRE impacts time-
of-day and seasonal pricing patterns, often depressing prices when VRE supply is high but, in some 
cases, inflating prices at other times. 
 
The analysis demonstrates that the frequency of negative prices is correlated geographically with VRE 
deployment, and that negative prices in high-VRE regions occur most frequently in those hours with 
high VRE output.  Despite the recent increase in frequency of negative prices, annual average LMPs at 
most locations have not been heavily impacted by these negative-price hours (i.e., negative prices were 
mostly small in magnitude).  However, some regions have seen significant declines in annual average 
LMPs owing to negative hourly prices, specifically regions in SPP, regions in CAISO, and northern areas 
of New York, New Hampshire, and Maine. 
 
Along with the limited regional impacts of negative prices, negative prices reduced the prices near 
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wind, solar, and hydropower generators significantly more than near natural gas, nuclear, and coal 
generators. 
 
Finally, through a series of in-depth regional analyses, this analysis shows how numerous factors 
beyond VRE have interacted with VRE to influence local pricing patterns.  For example, given the 
backdrop of expanding VRE, annual changes in hydropower output drove negative pricing events in the 
Northwest; nuclear retirements, changes in load, and solar expansion led to markedly different diurnal 
patterns of pricing in California; and the expansion of transmission reduced negative-price hours near 
wind in Texas and near nuclear in Illinois.  The conclusion to draw from all of this is that, while 
expansion of wind and solar is leading to significant changes in pricing patterns in some regions (by 
reducing prices, increasing the frequency of negative-price hours, and changing the diurnal patterns of 
pricing), other factors are also influencing pricing patterns, and attempts to assess the impacts of VRE 
must carefully consider the full regional context. 
 
A number of important additional areas of research are not covered in this analysis. 
 
• VRE and other factors are likely to impact other grid services priced in wholesale markets, including 
capacity and ancillary services.  Similar to wholesale energy prices, the price of these services varies 
by region and has changed over time.  While the analysis presented in this paper focuses exclusively 
on energy prices, additional assessments might usefully also address capacity and ancillary service 
markets, including uplift payments associated with generation that is directed by system operators 
to operate in ways that differ from their schedule. 
• Price changes have differential impacts on the revenue earned by different resources depending on 
whether the resource operates at a near-constant output irrespective of grid conditions (e.g., 
nuclear), the resource flexibly responds to changing grid conditions as signaled by changing prices 
(e.g., combustion turbines), or the resource dispatch is variable and largely driven by weather (e.g., 
wind and solar).  Future research might therefore explore the implications of price changes on the 
net revenue of different generation assets, depending on their typical dispatch patterns. 
• Storage and flexible demand can mitigate some of the price variability associated with growing 
shares of VRE.  While storage was not accounted for in the simple supply-curve model, other 
approaches are available to integrate storage and other more-complicated features of electricity 
markets into fundamental models of wholesale prices.  Incorporating storage into the analysis 
appears to be particularly important for assessing near-future wholesale prices in the solar-
dominated California market. 
• Exploring longer-term power-sector transformation scenarios and related impacts on pricing and 
market design will require more sophisticated tools than employed in the present paper.  Use of 
such tools can enable a more thorough investigation of future temporal and geographic pricing 
patterns under a range of future assumptions and conditions.  Of particular interest for an 
investigation with such tools will be the impact of VRE on price volatility and the subsequent impact 
on revenues of flexible resources.  
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Appendix	A:	Detailed	Description	of	Simple	Supply-Curve	Model	
of	Wholesale	Power	Energy	Prices	
A relatively simple supply-curve model is used to estimate hourly market-clearing prices for electricity 
in each region based on finding the intersection of the demand and supply curves.  This hourly price is 
then averaged over the year to estimate the annual average reported in the analysis.  For simplicity, 
certain resources that vary with time (e.g., VRE, imports, and hydropower) are netted from the demand 
curve (using the resulting net demand) and the supply curve includes only thermal resources.  This only 
affects the way the analysis is conducted, not the result (i.e., subtracting a variable resource from the 
demand curve has the same effect on the price as adding the resource to the supply curve). 
 
The supply curve is based on a simple merit order of generation from lowest marginal cost to highest 
marginal cost.  The estimated marginal cost of each plant is based on the heat rate of the unit, the fuel 
cost, the emissions rate of the unit, the emissions price, and other variable operations and maintenance 
costs.  Natural gas fuel costs vary on a daily basis following the trading price at major natural gas trading 
hubs.  Coal fuel costs vary on a monthly basis following average coal production costs in each plant’s 
state as reported by EIA.  The capacity of each generator is based on its summer or winter capacity, 
depending on the season, de-rated by a seasonal availability factor.  The summer capacity is de-rated 
using only the forced outage rate, whereas the winter capacity is de-rated by both the forced outage 
rate and the scheduled outage rate.  By applying the scheduled outage rate to the winter capacity, the 
model, in effect, assumes that scheduled maintenance occurs only in the winter.  Outage rates are 
technology specific (rather than unit specific).  With two exceptions, this simple supply curve ignores 
numerous real constraints, including unit-specific minimum-generation levels, startup times, ramp 
rates, transmission limits, heat rate variation based on loading, etc.  The first exception is that nuclear 
plants are assumed to always be at full capacity (accounting for de-rates) and that combined-heat-and-
power units are assumed to not drop below 35% of their capacity (Denholm, Brinkman, and Mai 2018).  
The second exception is that a transmission constraint is included between PJM East and PJM West 
(additional details below), because modeling PJM as a single market consistently deviated from actual 
historical prices. 
 
Despite the many simplifications, the supply-curve approach does a reasonably good job of estimating 
annual average wholesale prices for all markets, with the largest errors occurring in SPP.  The remainder 
of this appendix provides greater detail on the key assumptions and data sources used in modeling 
wholesale electricity prices; additional details are available from the authors. 
 
Demand  
Hourly 2008–2017 load profiles, net of distributed photovoltaics (DPV), for each market were taken 
directly from ABB’s Velocity Suite database.  For CAISO, ERCOT, PJM East, NYISO, and ISO-NE, these 
demand profiles were used directly.  For other regions, the historical demand does not match with the 
current generation assigned to that market in ABB Velocity Suite, because the market footprint changed 
over the historical period considered.  In these cases, the ISO/RTO-reported demand was scaled-up in 
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earlier years to match the more recent ratio of EIA-reported sales in states currently covered by the 
ISO/RTO to the ISO/RTO-reported demand.  Demand in 2008 for SPP was scaled based on sales in 
Oklahoma, Kansas, Nebraska, South Dakota, North Dakota, and Missouri.  Demand in 2008 and 2012 for 
MISO was scaled based on sales in Louisiana, Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Iowa, Wisconsin, 
Minnesota, and North Dakota.  Demand in 2008 and 2012 in PJM West was scaled based on sales in 
Illinois, Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and West Virginia.  The result is that each ISO/RTO is effectively 
modeled based on its 2017 footprint, even in earlier years.46  
 
Demand was then calculated by adding DPV profiles, described below, to the demand net of DPV.  To 
project demand profiles to 2022, 2017 demand shapes from each ISO/RTO were increased by an 
ISO/RTO-specific growth rate.  The growth rate was calculated using the EIA 2018 Annual Energy 
Outlook (AEO) projection of each ISO/RTO region’s demand growth between 2017 and 2022. 
 
Wind  
Hourly 2008–2017 wind data for MISO, SPP, ERCOT, and PJM were taken directly from ABB’s Velocity 
Suite database.  ABB did not have data from 2008 for CAISO nor for 2008 and 2012 for ISO-NE and 
NYISO.  Aggregate wind profiles for 2012 for ISO-NE and NYISO were provided directly by the respective 
ISO/RTO.47 Wind output in 2008 was estimated using a regression analysis that took actual wind data 
from 2011–2012 and regressed it against modeled wind data (and other weather data) from the 
National Renewable Energy Laboratory’s (NREL’s) Wind Integration National Dataset Toolkit from 2011–
2012.  The resulting regression model was used to predict actual ISO/RTO-specific 2008 wind output for 
ISO-NE, NYISO, and CAISO.  The regression model used a non-parametric regression technique that 
pruned non-explanatory covariates to reduce overfitting concerns. 
 
To project wind profiles to 2022, 2017 wind shapes from each ISO/RTO were increased by an ISO/RTO-
specific growth rate.  The growth rate was calculated using EIA AEO 2018’s projection of each region’s 
wind energy growth between 2017 and 2022. 
  
 46	As	discussed	below,	wind,	solar,	hydropower,	and	imports	were	not	adjusted	based	on	the	changing	footprint	of	the	ISO/RTO.		Instead	the	hourly	data	directly	from	the	ISO/RTO	was	used.		For	VRE-related	results,	this	is	a	minor	issue	for	the	three	affected	regions	(SPP,	MISO,	and	PJM	West),	because	VRE	penetrations	in	2008	were	much	lower	than	in	2017,	irrespective	of	the	footprint.		Assignment	of	thermal	generation	to	an	ISO/RTO,	on	the	other	hand,	was	kept	consistent	with	the	2017	footprint	in	all	years.	47	ISO-NE	wind	data	from	www.iso-ne.com	and	NYISO	wind	data	from	personal	communication	with	Arvind	Jaggi.	
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 Wind Penetration 
             
Market 2008 2012 2017 2022 
CAISO 1.1% 2.8% 4.5% 8.6% 
ERCOT 4.9% 9.2% 17.4% 20.3% 
SPP 2.6% 7.5% 25.3% 39.5% 
MISO 1.3% 4.7% 7.7% 11.6% 
PJM 0.4% 1.6% 2.7% 3.3% 
NYISO 0.7% 1.7% 2.7% 3.8% 
ISO-NE 0.1% 0.9% 2.8% 3.1% 
	
Utility-Scale Photovoltaics 
Various data sources were used to build the utility-scale photovoltaics (UPV) profiles.  For ERCOT 
(2012–2017) and CAISO (2017), hourly UPV data were taken directly from ABB’s Velocity Suite 
database.  ABB data were also used for solar shapes in PJM (2017) and ISO-NE (2017); however, solar 
production estimates from Greentech Media (GTM)/Solar Energy Industries Association (SEIA)48 were 
used to scale the ABB data, because the ISO/RTO-provided hourly data cover only a fraction of the UPV 
capacity installed in these regions. 
 
For all other years and ISO/RTO regions, solar shapes were simulated using a combination of NREL’s 
National Solar Radiation Database (NSRDB) and EIA form 860’s utility-scale solar installation data.  
There were four steps to create these shapes: (1) calculate UPV capacity by lat/long coordinate using 
EIA 860; (2) collect historical solar irradiation data for each lat/long coordinate using the NSRDB (2008–
2017); (3) simulate hourly solar capacity factors using the irradiation data and NREL’s System Advisor 
Model (SAM); and (4) weight the capacity factors for each lat/long coordinate by the EIA capacity.  This 
method was employed for each ISO/RTO in this analysis by assigning each lat/long coordinate to a 
specific ISO/RTO region. 
 
 48	Specifically,	GTM/SEIA	data	were	used	to	estimate	state-level	solar	capacity	additions,	supplemented	by	Interstate	Renewable	Energy	Council	data	for	earlier	years;	see	Wiser	et	al.	(2017)	for	more	details.	
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The hourly solar shapes were scaled to match the total annual solar energy production for a given year 
and region.  For each ISO/RTO region, hourly generation was calculated using installed UPV capacity 
(2008–2017) by date from ABB’s Velocity Suite generator database.  The resulting UPV generation 
output was used directly for every year for MISO and SPP, where a changing ISO/RTO footprint would 
have made the alternative of scaling the output to state-based estimates of solar less accurate.  For the 
other regions, which had stable ISO/RTO footprints, the UPV generation was scaled using total UPV 
energy production estimates from GTM/SEIA.  The table above summarizes the data sources for the 
UPV profiles used in this analysis. 
 
To project UPV profiles to 2022, 2017 UPV shapes from each ISO/RTO were increased by an ISO/RTO-
specific growth rate.  The growth rate was calculated using EIA AEO 2018’s projection of each region’s 
UPV energy growth between 2017 and 2022. 
 
Solar Penetration49 
          
     
Market 2008 2012 2017 2022 
CAISO 0.5% 1.1% 13.5% 25.8% 
ERCOT 0.0% 0.1% 0.7% 2.1% 
SPP 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 0.3% 
MISO 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 0.7% 
PJM 0.0% 0.2% 0.9% 1.3% 
NYISO 0.0% 0.1% 0.8% 1.7% 
ISO-NE 0.0% 0.2% 2.4% 6.0% 
 49	Solar	penetration	in	this	table	reflects	both	UPV	and	DPV	generation	as	a	percentage	of	annual	energy	from	demand.	
Source	of	ISO	UPV	Data
Zone 2008 2012 2017
MISO
ISO-NE
NYISO
CAISO
ERCOT
SPP
PJM	East
PJM	West
Actual	ISO	data	from	ABB
Shapes	from	ABB	scaled	by	GTM/SEIA	energy	amount
Simulated	using	NSRDB	and	EIA	data
Shapes	from	NSRDB/EIA	simulation	scaled	by	GTM/SEIA	energy	amount
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Distributed Photovoltaics 
Similar to the majority of UPV profiles, a combination of NREL’s NSRDB and estimates of DPV energy 
production for each ISO/RTO from GTM/SEIA were used to generate DPV profiles.  In addition, 
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory’s Tracking the Sun (TTS) database of non-utility-scale DPV 
installations was used for those states covered by TTS.  There were five steps to create these profiles: 
(1) calculate DPV capacity by county using the TTS dataset; (2) collect historical solar irradiation data for 
each county in TTS using the NSRDB (2008–2017); (3) simulate hourly solar capacity factors using the 
irradiation data and NREL’s SAM; (4) weight the capacity factors by county by the TTS country-level 
capacity within an ISO/RTO region; and (5) scale the hourly capacity factors by the annual DPV energy 
production estimates.  This method was employed for each ISO/RTO in this analysis by assigning each 
county a specific ISO/RTO region. 
 
To project DPV profiles to 2022, 2017 DPV shapes from each ISO/RTO were increased by an ISO/RTO-
specific growth rate.  The growth rate was calculated using EIA AEO 2018’s projection of each ISO/RTO 
region’s onsite solar energy growth between 2017 and 2022. 
 
Other Renewable Energy Profiles  
Other renewable energy profiles (geothermal, biomass, etc.) were included in the net demand 
calculations for CAISO, where the other renewable energy quantities are a substantial fraction of overall 
generation, and historical hourly data are available over a long period.  Hourly profiles for 2012 and 
2017 were taken directly from ABB’s Velocity Suite database.  For 2008, the hourly profile from 2016 
was scaled by the monthly ratio of 2008 to 2016 generation from other renewable energy reported to 
EIA.  In other ISOs/RTOs, the other renewable energy is a much smaller share of total generation, and it 
was included in the dispatch stack of the supply curve as a thermal generator. 	
For the future projections, the 2017 profile was used for 2022, holing the other renewable energy 
constant. 
 
Hydropower 
Rather than using static dispatch profiles for hydropower, hydropower was assumed to be dispatched 
in response to the net demand (demand less wind and solar in this case) and as a function of 
precipitation.  The relationship between hydropower, net demand, and precipitation was developed 
using regressions over an historical period depending on data availability.  Precipitation data were 
based on a monthly value of the moving average of precipitation measured at a U.S.  Geological Survey 
gauge in each region with a window of 1 year.  Hydropower regressions were developed for CAISO, ISO-
NE, and NYISO.  Hydropower was excluded altogether in all other regions, given its small share of total 
generation. 
 
The justification for using a historical relationship between net demand and hydropower production, 
rather than static profiles, is that hydropower production—like thermal plant production—would be 
different than historically observed if the net demand were different than observed.  For example, 
using a static hydropower profile from 2017 implicitly assumes that hydropower production would not 
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be any different had solar generation decreased to 2008 levels.  By dynamically adjusting the 
hydropower profile, based on historical relationships between hydropower and net demand, the 
responsiveness of hydropower to grid conditions is better captured by the model. 
 
For the future projections, the 2017 precipitation was used for 2022, holding the precipitation constant. 
 
Imports  
Similar to hydropower, imports were allowed to vary with the hourly net demand rather than using 
static profiles.  Imports are based on a regression of net demand, the square of net demand, and 
monthly imports estimated from EIA.  For most regions, the hourly import data used in the regression 
are based on the total net actual interchange from EIA’s U.S.  Electric System Operating Data (using 
data from 2016–2017).  For CAISO and PJM, longer histories of hourly import profiles provided by ABB 
were used.  In the case of MISO, the amount of imports from the regressions differed from annual 
average imports reported by the MISO market monitor.  These differences were large enough to 
adversely affect the average wholesale prices from the model.  In this case, the imports from the 
regression were scaled by the historical annual average reported by the market monitor. 
 
For the future projections, the 2017 monthly net imports were used for 2022, holding the net imports 
constant. 
 
Thermal Generators 
Data for thermal generators were primarily obtained directly from the ABB Velocity Suite database, 
including the ISO/RTO where the generator operates, summer and winter capacity, forced outage rate, 
scheduled outage rate, whether or not the generator is a combined-heat-and-power unit, and variable 
operations and maintenance costs.  The heat rate and emissions rate for each unit are based on U.S.  
Environmental Protection Agency continuous emission monitoring system (CEMS) data similarly 
accessed through ABB Velocity Suite.  Unit-specific heat rates and emissions rates for each month of 
2008, 2012, and 2017 were based on the CEMS data.  Where data were not directly available for a 
particular month or year, averages for similar plants in the same market region were used. 
 
For the projections of generator capacity to 2022, a regional rate of additions or retirements from EIA 
AEO 2018’s projection of each region’s rate between 2017 and 2022 were used to adjust coal, oil and 
natural gas steam, combined cycle, combustion turbine/diesel, and nuclear generation capacity.  
Existing generators with the earliest planned retirement dates were selected for retirement up to the 
level of retirement projected by EIA (continuing with selecting the oldest generators if more needed to 
be retired).  New generation capacity that was added was assumed to have characteristics similar to the 
most recently built generation of the same type in each ISO/RTO. 
 
Fuel Costs 
Daily natural gas prices from major trading hubs in each region were obtained from ABB’s Velocity 
Suite.  Hubs were selected largely based on guidance from market monitoring reports for each ISO/RTO. 
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Monthly coal fuel costs were calculated as the average coal production cost in each state and month as 
reported to EIA.  The production cost data were accessed through ABB’s Velocity Suite. 
 
Annual fuel costs for other fuels (petroleum, uranium, renewable, etc.) were calculated as the average 
fuel costs in each region for each fuel as reported to EIA and accessed through ABB Velocity Suite. 
 
Fuel costs to 2022, were calculated based on a percent fuel cost change between 2017 and 
2022 for each ISO/RTO using EIA AEO 2018.  Future coal, natural gas, and petroleum fuel costs 
were available through the EIA AEO.  This percent cost change was then applied to the 2017 
price data for each ISO/RTO region.  Other fuel costs were assumed to not change from 2017 to 
2022. 
  
Emissions Prices 
The effects of emissions prices for NOx, SO2, and CO2 in each region depended on whether a 
majority of plants in the specific ISO/RTO region faced those costs.  Data determining whether a 
generator was impacted by an emissions price were taken from ABB’s Velocity Suite generator 
database.  NOx and SO2 emissions prices were taken from SNL Financial from 2008–2017.  
California carbon prices were taken from the Climate Policy Initiative, and RGGI prices were 
taken from SNL (2014–2017) and from EIA (2008–2014).50 
 
Projections of CO2 prices to 2022, relied on California Energy Commission projections for California’s 
cap-and-trade program and NYISO projections for RGGI carbon prices.  NOx and SO2 prices were held 
constant between 2017 and 2022. 
 
Negative Bids 
As described above, when the net load exceeds the minimum generation level, prices are assumed to 
fall to the level of negative bids.  The assumed negative bids varied across regions based on the 
observed average negative price across nodes in each market for 2017. 
 50	California	dashboard:	http://calcarbondash.org/	and	EIA	RGGI	price:	https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=31432.		
Market Years Name
CAISO 2008 SoCal	Border
CAISO 2012-2017 SoCal	Citygate
ERCOT 2008-2017 Houston	Ship	Channel
SPP 2008-2017 Panhandle
MISO 2008-2017 Chicago	Citygate
PJM	West 2008-2017 Average	of	Dominion	North	Point,	Columbia	Appalachia,	and	Chicago	Citygate
PJM	East 2008-2017 Average	of	Texas	M3,	Transco	Zone	6	non-NY,	Transco	Zone	6	NY	and	Transco	Zone	5
NYISO 2008-2012 Average	of	Iroquois	Zone	2	and	TETCO	3
NYISO 2017 Average	of	Iroquois	Zone	2	and	the	Millenium	Hub
ISO-NE 2008-2017 Algonquin	Citygates
Natural	Gas	Price	Hubs
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Negative Bids 
    
  
Market $/MWh 
CAISO -$9.9 
ERCOT -$2.6 
SPP -$9.6 
MISO -$11.7 
PJM -$10.2 
NYISO -$10.5 
ISO-NE -$17.1 
	
PJM Split 
In PJM, a transmission constraint was included to more accurately represent the flow of energy 
between PJM West and PJM East during constrained hours.  The 5,000-MW transfer capability 
between the regions was based on PJM’s transfer limits and flows database.51 Methods to 
model centralized trading in a two-bus system described by Kirschen and Strbac (2004) were 
used to simulate the market-clearing price in the PJM East region, where the price hub of 
interest for PJM was located (see next section).  The transmission constraint served to limit 
generators located in one region from supplying load in the other region.  The general logic 
applied worked as follows:  
(a) Calculate the unconstrained transmission flow by finding how much generation would need to 
flow from one region to the other to meet demand with a single market-clearing price. 
(b) If the unconstrained transmission flow was less than the transmission capacity between the 
regions, then use the single price for both regions. 
(c) If the unconstrained transmission flow was greater than the transmission capacity, then increase 
the effective demand in the low-cost region by 5,000 MW and decrease the effective demand in 
the high-cost region by 5,000 MW.  Find the resulting prices in each region with the new 
effective demand. 
 
Validation with Actual Prices 
The annual average wholesale prices from the model were compared to actual annual average 
wholesale power energy prices in the RT market from major trading hubs in each region. 	
 51	Find	transfer	limit	and	flow	data	here:	https://dataminer2.pjm.com/feed/transfer_limits_and_flows/definition.	
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One way to validate the modeled prices is to compare the price distribution curves of the 
modeled prices to the price distribution curves of the actual RT market prices at the hubs.  
These are shown for each region below, along with a comparison of the average modeled and 
actual RT prices. 
Figure	29.	Price	duration	curves	for	modeled	and	actual	RT	prices	for	CAISO.	
 
 
Figure	30.	Price	duration	curves	for	modeled	and	actual	RT	prices	for	ERCOT.	
  
Market Years Name
CAISO 2008-2017 SP15
ERCOT 2008-2017 North
SPP 2008-2012 OKGE
SPP 2017 South	Hub
MISO 2008 Cinergy
MISO 2012-2017 Indiana	Hub
PJM 2008-2017 Western	Hub
NYISO 2008-2017 Hudson	Valley	Zone	G
ISO-NE 2008-2017 Mass.	Hub
Wholesale	Electricity	Price	Hubs
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Figure	31.	Price	duration	curves	for	modeled	and	actual	RT	prices	for	SPP.	
 
	
Figure	32.	Price	duration	curves	for	modeled	and	actual	RT	prices	for	MISO.	
 
 
Figure	33.	Price	duration	curves	for	modeled	and	actual	RT	prices	for	PJM.	
 
 
	 	 	
Drivers of Wholesale Power Prices│68 
Figure	34.	Price	duration	curves	for	modeled	and	actual	RT	prices	for	NYISO.	
 
 
Figure	35.	Price	duration	curves	for	modeled	and	actual	RT	prices	for	ISO-NE.	
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Appendix	B:	How	Non-Linear	Interactions	Inhibit	
Quantification	of	Individual	Factors’	Contributions	to	Changes	
in	Wholesale	Prices		
This appendix addresses the question of how non-linear interactions can prevent quantification of 
individual factors’ contributions to changes in wholesale prices.  First it illustrates that non-linear 
interactions do not occur when a supply curve is only shifted up or down.  Then it shows how changes 
in the slope of the supply curve lead to non-linear interactions. 
 
Consider a case where the supply curve (S) only shifts up and down, but the slope of the supply curve 
does not change with time (i.e., bt can change over time, but m is fixed), illustrated by Figure 36.  To 
further simplify, assume that demand (d) is fixed and only wind changes with time (wt).  The price (p) 
will be the intersection of the supply and demand curve, Eq. 1. 
 !(#$, &$) = () − #$)+ + &$ 
(1) 
Figure	36.	Supply	curve	with	a	fixed	slope	and	changes	in	the	offset	with	time.	
 
 
Compare the price impact of changing one factor at a time (wt and bt) to the price impact of changing 
multiple factors at the same time to determine if there are any non-linear interactions.  In the case of a 
supply curve that only shifts up or down, there is no non-linear interaction. 
 
The price impact of changing wind from w2 to w1 (where ∆# = #. − #/) is: ∆!0 = !(#., &.) − !(#/, &.) = −∆# ∙ + 
(2) 
The price impact of changing the supply curve by shifting the offset from b2 to b1 (where ∆& = &. − &/) 
is: ∆!2 = !(#., &.) − !(#., &/) = ∆& 
(3) 
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The price impact of changing both the offset of the supply curve and the wind at the same time is: ∆!0,2 = !(#., &.) − !(#/, &/) = ∆& − ∆# ∙ + 
(4) 
The difference in the price impact from changing multiple factors at one time compared to the 
summation of the price impacts from changing the factors one at a time is a measure of the interaction.  
In the case where the supply curve is only shifted up or down, but the slope is not changed, there is no 
non-linear interaction.  Hence, there is no difference in the price impact of changing factors 
simultaneously or summing the impact of changing factors individually: 
 34567895:;4 = 	∆!0,2 − =∆!0 + ∆!2> = ∆& − ∆# ∙ + − (−∆# ∙ + + ∆&) = 0 
(5) 
Now consider a case where, instead of the supply curve shifting up or down, the slope of the supply 
curve increases or decreases (Figure 37). 
Figure	37.	Supply	curve	with	a	fixed	offset	and	changing	slope	with	time.	
 
 
The price impact of changing wind from w2 to w1 (where ∆# = #. − #/) is: ∆!0 = !(#.,+.) − !(#/,+.) = −∆# ∙ +. 
(6) 
The price impact of changing the supply curve by changing the slope from m2 to m1 (where ∆+ = +. −+/) is: ∆!? = !(#.,+.) − !(#.,+/) = () − #.)∆+ 
(7) 
The price impact of changing both the slope of the supply curve and the wind at the same time is: ∆!0,? = !(#.,+.) − !(#/,+/) = )∆+ − (#.+.@#/+/) 
(8) 
In the case where the slope of the supply curve changes, the non-linear interaction is non-zero.  This 
non-linear interaction will lead to a difference between the effect of changing factors individually 
versus changing them simultaneously.  For this case, the size of the interaction depends on the change 
in the slope and the change in wind: 34567895:;4 = 	∆!0,? − (∆!0 + ∆!?) = ∆+∆# 
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(9) 
The larger interaction term in SPP relative to CAISO can be explained in part by the more significant 
changes to the slope of the supply curve in SPP between 2008 and 2017.  In contrast, higher gas prices 
in 2008 primarily shifted the supply curve up in CAISO (without significantly changing the slope) over 
the range of net demand levels in CAISO, as shown in Figure 38. 
Figure	38.	The	supply	curve	for	CAISO	(left)	shows	little	change	in	the	slope	between	2008	and	2017,	
whereas	the	slope	more	dramatically	changed	in	SPP	over	the	same	period	(right).	
CAISO 
 
SPP 
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Appendix	C:	Wholesale	Power	Energy	Price	Impacts	of	
Individual	Factors	with	a	2008	Base	Year	
The primary analysis in the main text uses 2017 as a base year, meaning that all factors were 
kept constant at their 2017 levels, except one factor at a time was changed to its 2008 level.  
With 2017 as a base year, the non-linear interactions leads to an understatement of the overall 
change in prices between 2008 and 2017 due to the relatively flat supply curve in 2017. 
 
Alternatively, 2008, a year with high natural gas prices and a relatively steep supply curve, can 
be the base year (Figure 39).  With 2008 as the base year, changing individual factors to their 
2017 levels tends to lead to overstated impacts.  Natural gas remains by far the largest driver of 
changes in wholesale prices.  The estimated impacts of wind and solar on average wholesale 
prices are much larger than found with 2017 as the base year, again due to the steeper supply 
curve in 2008 in comparison to 2017.  The same is true for most other factors, given the steeper 
supply curve. 
 
The use of 2017 as the base year is preferred, because it includes conditions that better reflect 
current reality. 
Figure	39.	Wholesale	price	impact	of	various	factors	that	changed	between	2008	and	2017	across	all	
markets	using	a	base	year	of	2008.	
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Appendix	D:	EIA	Annual	Energy	Outlook	and	ABB	Velocity	Suite	
Projections	for	2022	
As discussed in Section 3.6, projections from both EIA’s AEO 2018 and ABB’s Velocity Suite database are 
used to model wholesale electricity price increases between 2017 and 2022 for all seven markets.  This 
appendix presents the key assumptions used to model future-year generator additions/retirements, 
demand growth, and fuel price changes.  ABB’s Velocity Suite did not provide forecasts of demand 
growth, fuel price changes, and DPV increases to 2022.  For that reason, these data inputs to the 2022 
modeling stay the same between the EIA case (Section 3.6) and ABB case (Appendix E).  Items in the 
tables below that do not have data projections from ABB’s Velocity Suite are marked as “-‘’.  For the 
most part, the increase in wind and utility-scale solar in ABB’s Velocity Suite is greater than EIA’s AEO 
reference case, while the thermal generation additions and retirements are more similar to one 
another. 
 
Table	2.	EIA	and	ABB	projections	of	generation	additions	by	2022.	
               
Region Category 
AEO 2022 
Additions (GW) 
AEO % growth 
(2017-2022) 
ABB % growth 
(2017-2022) 
     
ERCOT Coal 0.0 0% 0% 
ERCOT 
Oil and Natural Gas 
Steam 0.0 0% 0% 
ERCOT Combined Cycle 3.2 9% 23% 
ERCOT 
Combustion 
Turbine/Diesel 9.6 150% 37% 
ERCOT Nuclear 0.0 0% 0% 
MISO Coal 0.0 0% 0% 
MISO 
Oil and Natural Gas 
Steam 0.0 0% 1% 
MISO Combined Cycle 3.9 19% 15% 
MISO 
Combustion 
Turbine/Diesel 1.3 7% 3% 
MISO Nuclear 0.0 0% 0% 
SPP Coal 0.0 0% 0% 
SPP 
Oil and Natural Gas 
Steam 0.0 0% 0% 
SPP Combined Cycle 0.0 0% 0% 
SPP 
Combustion 
Turbine/Diesel 0.6 6% 1% 
SPP Nuclear 0.0 0% 0% 
NYISO Coal 0.0 0% 0% 
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NYISO 
Oil and Natural Gas 
Steam 0.0 0% 0% 
NYISO Combined Cycle 1.7 19% 37% 
NYISO 
Combustion 
Turbine/Diesel 0.5 9% 3% 
NYISO Nuclear 0.0 0% 0% 
ISO-NE Coal 0.0 0% 0% 
ISO-NE 
Oil and Natural Gas 
Steam 0.0 0% 0% 
ISO-NE Combined Cycle 0.7 6% 19% 
ISO-NE 
Combustion 
Turbine/Diesel 0.6 22% 7% 
ISO-NE Nuclear 0.0 0% 0% 
CAISO Coal 0.0 0% 0% 
CAISO 
Oil and Natural Gas 
Steam 0.0 0% 0% 
CAISO Combined Cycle 1.1 6% 12% 
CAISO 
Combustion 
Turbine/Diesel 0.7 6% 8% 
CAISO Nuclear 0.0 0% 0% 
PJM East Coal 0.0 0% 0% 
PJM East 
Oil and Natural Gas 
Steam 0.2 3% 1% 
PJM East Combined Cycle 6.4 33% 71% 
PJM East 
Combustion 
Turbine/Diesel 0.4 6% 2% 
PJM East Nuclear 0.0 0% 4% 
PJM West Coal 0.0 0% 0% 
PJM West 
Oil and Natural Gas 
Steam 0.1 5% 1% 
PJM West Combined Cycle 4.2 31% 71% 
PJM West 
Combustion 
Turbine/Diesel 0.1 0% 2% 
PJM West Nuclear 0.0 0% 4% 
          
     
 
Table	3.	EIA	and	ABB	projections	of	generator	retirements	by	2022.	
          
     
Region Category 
AEO 2022 
Retirements 
(GW) 
AEO % reduction 
(2017-2022) 
ABB % 
reduction 
(2017-2022) 
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ERCOT Coal 7.3 37% 34% 
ERCOT 
Oil and Natural Gas 
Steam 1.0 8% 4% 
ERCOT Combined Cycle 0.1 0% 0% 
ERCOT 
Combustion 
Turbine/Diesel 0.0 0% 1% 
ERCOT Nuclear 0.0 0% 0% 
MISO Coal 1.8 5% 15% 
MISO 
Oil and Natural Gas 
Steam 1.7 11% 18% 
MISO Combined Cycle 0.3 2% 0% 
MISO 
Combustion 
Turbine/Diesel 1.0 5% 9% 
MISO Nuclear 0.8 8% 10% 
SPP Coal 2.2 12% 5% 
SPP 
Oil and Natural Gas 
Steam 2.7 23% 13% 
SPP Combined Cycle 0.6 5% 0% 
SPP 
Combustion 
Turbine/Diesel 0.7 7% 9% 
SPP Nuclear 0.0 0% 0% 
NYISO Coal 0.2 9% 24% 
NYISO 
Oil and Natural Gas 
Steam 0.0 0% 10% 
NYISO Combined Cycle 0.1 1% 0% 
NYISO 
Combustion 
Turbine/Diesel 0.1 2% 44% 
NYISO Nuclear 2.1 38% 40% 
ISO-NE Coal 0.2 22% 49% 
ISO-NE 
Oil and Natural Gas 
Steam 0.2 4% 4% 
ISO-NE Combined Cycle 1.2 10% 0% 
ISO-NE 
Combustion 
Turbine/Diesel 0.0 0% 24% 
ISO-NE Nuclear 0.7 17% 15% 
CAISO Coal 0.0 0% 0% 
CAISO 
Oil and Natural Gas 
Steam 5.4 49% 114% 
CAISO Combined Cycle 1.3 7% 0% 
CAISO 
Combustion 
Turbine/Diesel 2.2 21% 5% 
CAISO Nuclear 0.0 0% 0% 
PJM East Coal 1.3 10% 21% 
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PJM East 
Oil and Natural Gas 
Steam 1.8 28% 19% 
PJM East Combined Cycle 0.7 4% 1% 
PJM East 
Combustion 
Turbine/Diesel 0.5 6% 10% 
PJM East Nuclear 1.4 10% 16% 
PJM West Coal 7.5 13% 21% 
PJM West 
Oil and Natural Gas 
Steam 1.3 64% 19% 
PJM West Combined Cycle 0.0 0% 1% 
PJM West 
Combustion 
Turbine/Diesel 0.3 2% 10% 
PJM West Nuclear 2.1 12% 16% 
          
     
 
Table	4.	EIA	projections	of	fuel	cost	increases	to	2022.	
          
     
Region Category 
AEO 2022 
Price 
($/MMBtu) 
AEO % 
increase 
(2017-2022) 
ABB % 
increase 
(2017-2022) 
     
ERCOT Coal 2.6 21% - 
ERCOT Natural Gas 4.3 38% - 
ERCOT 
Distillate Fuel 
Oil 21.7 57% - 
ERCOT 
Residual Fuel 
Oil 15.0 67% - 
MISO Coal 2.4 23% - 
MISO Natural Gas 4.6 36% - 
MISO 
Distillate Fuel 
Oil 20.8 48% - 
MISO 
Residual Fuel 
Oil 11.2 88% - 
SPP Coal 2.4 24% - 
SPP Natural Gas 4.6 40% - 
SPP 
Distillate Fuel 
Oil 21.1 50% - 
SPP 
Residual Fuel 
Oil 12.5 84% - 
NYISO Coal 15.2 13% - 
NYISO Natural Gas 4.5 38% - 
NYISO Distillate Fuel 25.4 80% - 
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Oil 
NYISO 
Residual Fuel 
Oil 15.3 58% - 
ISO-NE Coal 21.3 676% - 
ISO-NE Natural Gas 5.1 23% - 
ISO-NE 
Distillate Fuel 
Oil 22.1 58% - 
ISO-NE 
Residual Fuel 
Oil 15.1 31% - 
CAISO Coal 2.2 12% - 
CAISO Natural Gas 4.7 31% - 
CAISO 
Distillate Fuel 
Oil 24.6 75% - 
CAISO 
Residual Fuel 
Oil 19.8 49% - 
PJM East Coal 2.9 14% - 
PJM East Natural Gas 4.5 38% - 
PJM East 
Distillate Fuel 
Oil 25.0 78% - 
PJM East 
Residual Fuel 
Oil 14.1 35% - 
PJM West Coal 2.6 17% - 
PJM West Natural Gas 4.3 36% - 
PJM West 
Distillate Fuel 
Oil 21.7 54% - 
PJM West 
Residual Fuel 
Oil 14.3 71% - 
          
     
 
Table	5.	EIA	projections	of	demand	changes	to	2022.	
          
     
Region Category 
AEO 2022 
Demand 
(TWh/yr) 
AEO % 
increase 
(2017-
2022) 
ABB % 
increase 
(2017-
2022) 
     
ERCOT 
Total Net Energy for 
Load 383.4 9% - 
MISO 
Total Net Energy for 
Load 522.7 5% - 
SPP 
Total Net Energy for 
Load 227.3 7% - 
NYISO Total Net Energy for 154.8 2% - 
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Load 
ISO-NE 
Total Net Energy for 
Load 115.7 -4% - 
CAISO 
Total Net Energy for 
Load 281.2 2% - 
PJM East 
Total Net Energy for 
Load 274.1 2% - 
PJM West 
Total Net Energy for 
Load 518.0 3% - 
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Table	6.	EIA	and	ABB	projections	of	wind	and	solar	growth	to	2022.	
          
     
Region Category 
AEO 2022 
Generation 
(TWh/yr) 
AEO % 
increase 
(2017-2022) 
ABB % 
increase 
(2017-2022) 
     
ERCOT UPV 5.0 218% 739% 
ERCOT DPV 1.3 156% - 
ERCOT Wind 58.3 28% 78% 
MISO UPV 3.5 355% 368% 
MISO DPV 1.4 163% - 
MISO Wind 90.6 58% 93% 
SPP UPV 0.6 10% 156% 
SPP DPV 1.0 157% - 
SPP Wind 98.8 66% 102% 
NYISO UPV 0.8 334% 1605% 
NYISO DPV 3.4 89% - 
NYISO Wind 5.7 45% 272% 
ISO-NE UPV 0.9 7% 109% 
ISO-NE DPV 7.7 173% - 
ISO-NE Wind 3.8 10% 191% 
CAISO UPV 42.2 104% 68% 
CAISO DPV 17.9 99% - 
CAISO Wind 26.7 103% 51% 
PJM East UPV 1.4 11% 228% 
PJM East DPV 4.1 93% - 
PJM East Wind 3.5 17% 119% 
PJM West UPV 0.5 12% 228% 
PJM West DPV 1.5 103% - 
PJM West Wind 22.1 31% 119% 
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Appendix	E:	Outlook	to	2022	Based	on	ABB	Velocity	Suite		
An alternative to EIA’s reference case is to use the planned generation additions and 
retirements from ABB’s Velocity Suite.  This alternative results in greater VRE in all markets 
compared with EIA’s reference case except for CAISO, where EIA projects greater wind and 
solar.  Overall the conclusions based on using the EIA projections are not dramatically different.  
ABB’s Velocity Suite case leads to less price impacts from solar in CAISO and greater impacts of 
wind particularly in SPP, NYISO, and ERCOT. 
 
Figure	40.	Average	wholesale	power	energy	price	impact	of	various	factors	that	are	expected	to	
change	between	2017	and	2022	across	all	markets	using	ABB	Velocity	Suite	data	rather	than	EIA.	
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Appendix	F:	Median	of	Negative	Prices	
Both the frequency and magnitude of negative prices drive the overall impact of negative prices 
on the average price at various nodes.  The magnitude of negative prices, as measured by the 
median negative price in 2017, is larger in some regions than in others.  Areas in the Northeast, 
for example, have much larger negative prices than do the ERCOT portions of Texas. 
Figure	41.	Median	of	negative	LMPs	at	each	node	in	2017.	
 
LMP = locational marginal price  
2017
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Appendix	G:	Generation	Patterns	During	Positive-	and	
Negative-Price	Hours	in	Other	ISOs/RTOs	
Examination of generation data when the energy component of the LMP was negative (vs. positive) 
illustrates that wind generated more when prices were negative, though for MISO, ISO-NE, and NYISO 
wind was a relatively small fraction of the generation during these times.  In ERCOT and SPP, in 
contrast, wind was a large faction of the overall generation during times when the energy component 
of the LMP was negative.  For MISO, the energy component of the LMP was never negative in 2017, 
hence results for 2016 are shown instead.  For ISO-NE, NYISO, and ERCOT, this focus is on 2017, though 
the patterns in 2016 were similar.  For completeness, the generation as a percentage of peak output is 
also shown for CAISO.  
Figure	42.	Generation	during	times	when	the	energy	component	of	the	LMP	was	positive	or	negative	
in	MISO	for	2016.	
 
Figure	43.	Generation	during	times	when	the	energy	component	of	the	LMP	was	positive	or	negative	
in	NYISO	for	2017.	
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Figure	44.	Generation	during	times	when	the	energy	component	of	the	LMP	was	positive	or	negative	
in	ERCOT	for	2017.	
 
Figure	45.	Generation	during	times	when	the	energy	component	of	the	LMP	was	positive	or	negative	
in	ISO-NE	for	2017.	
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Figure	46.	Generation	during	times	when	the	energy	component	of	the	LMP	was	positive	or	negative	
in	PJM	for	2017.	
 
 
Figure	47.	Generation	during	times	when	the	energy	component	of	the	LMP	was	positive	or	negative	
in	CAISO	for	2017.	
 
 
